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THE OPTIMAL W i G  METHOD IS THE BORDA COUNT 
Centra l  t o  s o c i a l  choice i s  the development o f  techniques t o  aggregate 
i n d i v i d u a l  rank ings  o f  N a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n t o  a group ranking. Many approaches e x i s t ,  
but  i f  N)3, none does what we r e a l l y  what i t  t o  do. The d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  a l though 
i t  i s  c m o n  t o  t r e a t  the group's r ank ing  as i f  i t  were t r a n s i t i v e ,  i t  need n o t  be. 
I n  t h i s  paper, I'll analyze t h i s  soc ia l  cho ice problem f o r  v o t i n g  methods t o  show 
what can occur. (Th i s  i s  where, f o r  a g iven s e t  o f  weights  WI, .., wn, W J  
p o i n t s  a re  t a l l i e d  f o r  a voter 's  J T ~  place a l t e rna t i ve . )  For instance, i t  i s  
s tandard t o  c l a i m  tha t  p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  i s  among the worse methods t h a t  can be used. 
We support  t h i s  asse r t i on  by cha rac te r i z i ng  the incons is tenc ies  o f  i t s  e l e c t i o n  
r e s u l t s .  ( I n  a r e l a t e d  paper C101, i t  i s  shown tha t  the proposed reform method o f  
'approval vo t ing '  121 has fea tu res  even worse than p l u r a l i t y  vot ing.)  Then, 1'11 
propose a r e s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h i s  soc ia l  choice problem by determin ing what i s  the 
'best' v o t i n g  method. 
To see the problem, consider a hypo the t i ca l  s i t u a t i o n  where n ine  people s e l e c t  
a camnon luncheon beverage. Four o f  them have the rank ing  beer (b) over wine (w i )  
over water (wa) (b)wi)wa), three have the rank ing  wa>wi)b, and two have the r a n k i n g  
wi)b)wa. BY use o f  the p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  scheme ( o n l y  your f i r s t  p lace a l t e r n a t i v e  
i s  t a l l i e d ) ,  the group's rank ing  i s  b)wa)wi. I f  t h i s  rank ing  were t r a n s i t i v e ,  then, 
should beer be unava i lab le ,  water would be the group's second choice. But, 2/3 o f  
these people p re fe r  wine t o  water; indeed, a m a j o r i t y  of them p r e f e r  wine t o  beer!  
The rank ings  of the p a i r s  can be reversed when considered separate ly ;  thus the 
outcanes of p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  need no t  be cons is ten t .  
As i t  i s  w e l l  known, Arrow's theorem 111 asse r t s  f o r  N)3 t ha t  t h i s  phenamenon 
occurs f o r  anr n o n - d i c t a t o r i a l  aggregat ion technique which s a t i s f i e s  c e r t a i n  
standard cond i t ions .  I t  always i s  poss ib le  t o  f i n d  an example o f  voters '  
preferences where the group's rank ing  o f  N)3 a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  no t  cons is ten t  w i t h  how 
the same group, us i ng  the same (o r  any other  spec i f i ed )  procedure, ranks same p a i r  
of a l te rnat ives .  Universal consistency o f  the outcome i s  an imposs ib i l i t y .  
Yet, decisions must be made, so indiv idual  rankings must be aggregated i n t o  a 
group ranking. Consequently, even though a l l  vo t ing  methods are flawed, we need t o  
determine the 'best' one. To do th i s ,  the goal f o r  the se lec t ion  of an aggregation 
technique must be relaxed. Our u n r e a l i s t i c  dream was t o  f i n d  a procedure which 
always y i e l d s  a t r a n s i t i v e  ordering; a more r e a l i s t i c  ob jec t ive  i s  t o  f i n d  those 
vo t ing  techniques which minimize the damage t o  consistency. We w i l l  show that  .For 
vo t inq  methods, the Borda Count i s  the uniaue answer. Th is  i s  where n - j  po in ts  are 
t a l l i e d  f o r  a voter 's j T n  place a l te rnat ive .  (A r e l a t e d  issue ar ises f o r  ce r ta in  
ranking methods o f  nonparametric s t a t i s t i c s .  Again, the reso lu t i on  i s  the Borda 
Count . 
The Borda Count i s  optimal fo r  several reasons; the f i r s t  i s  w i t h  respect t o  
the rankings of p a i r s  of a1 ternat ives.  I f  sane a1 te rnat ive  i s  preferred t o  a1 1 
others by m a j o r i t y  votes (i.e., i t  i s  a Condorcet winner), then i t  shouldn't be 
ranked l a s t  i n  the ranking o f  the N a l te rnat ives .  But, the int roductory example 
i l l u s t r a t e s  that  a Condorcet winner (wine) can be ranked l a s t  by the p l u r a l i t y  vote. 
We show that  the Borda Count i s  the uniaue method which never ranks a Condorcet 
winner i n  l a s t   lace. nor a Condorcet loser i n  f i r s t .  
I f  a vo t ing  method i s  t o  be judged superior,  i t  must be decisive; i t  must adn i t  
fewer ranking inconsistencies than any other method. To invest igate t h i s  question, 
1'11 introduce sane natura l  measures o f  the inconsistencies permi t ted by a vo t i ng  
method. Again, i t  w i l l  t u rn  out that  the Borda Count i s  the unique, best solut ion.  
To gain a f l a v o r  o f  the type o f  measures which w i l l  be used, consider the set 
o f  four a l t e r n a t i v e s  (a~,at ,ar ,a+J.  Th is  set has one subset of four  
a l te rnat ives ,  four  subsets o f  three a l te rnat ives ,  and s i x  subsets of two 
a l te rnat ives .  For each subset, speci fy  a vo t ing  method; that  i s ,  speci fy  the number 
o f  po in ts  which are t o  be t a l l i e d  f o r  a voter 's j T H  ranked a l te rna t i ve  where j 
ranges over the number o f  a1 ternat ivcs. Let g denote the col  l e c t  ion o f  these eleven 
b a l l o t i n g  methods. Then, given W_ and the uoters' p r o f i l e s ,  the group's o rd ina l  
rankings f o r  each of  the eleven subsets i s  determined. As the voters'  p r o f i l e s  vary 
over a l l  poss ib le  choices, we obta in the set ,  Ru, o f  a l l  possible o rd ina l  rankings 
obtained from W. So, an element o f  Ru i s  a l i s t i n g  of  the eleven ord ina l  rankings 
r e s u l t i n g  fran sane p r o f i l e  o f  voters. Le t  FB when a l l  o f  the subsets are ranked 
by a Borda vector.  So, RB i s  a 1 i s t i n g  o f  a11 possible Borda rankings. 
C lea r l y ,  Ru contains a l l  t r a n s i t i v e  orderings; such an outcane r e s u l t s  when 
a l l  of the vo ters  have an i den t i ca l  rank ing  o f  the four a l te rna t ives .  So, i f  lRul 
i s  the c a r d i n a l i t y  of  Ru, then IRul-4! i s  the number o f  possible r e s u l t s  which 
are not t r a n s i t i v e .  (For N a l te rna t ives ,  IRul -N! is  the number of  non- t rans i t i ve  
outcanes.) I n  t h i s  way, lRul i s  a measure o f  the inconsistencies admitted by a 
set  o f  v o t i n g  methods. We show tha t  the unique. minimum value f o r  l R u l  occur2 
only  i f  the v o t i n q  methods f o r  a l l  subs_ets o f  a l t e rna t i ves  #re Borda Counts, i.e., 
IRu l l lRe l  f o r  a l l  choices o f  W. 
One d i f f  i c u l t y  w i t h  lRul i s  tha t  i t  doesn't ind icate what are the 
inconsis tent  rankings. For instance, i t  doesn't e l iminate the p o s s i b i l i t y  t ha t  
there are Borda rankings which, i n  sane sense, ' v i o la te  t r a n s i t i v i t y '  more so than 
any rank ing  introduced by sane other vo t i ng  system. This can't happen because Re 
i s  contained i n  Ru f o r  a11 choices of  Y. &y nont rans i t i ve  rankina admitted & 1 
Borda Count a l so  i s  admitted by any other set o f  u o t i n q  methods. 
-
A consequence of  the above i s  that  the Borda Count admits only  those 
inconsis tencies which are unavoidable. Thus, we need t o  k n w  what they are; we need 
t o  character ize Re. I t  turns out t o  be i n e f f i c i e n t  t o  catalogue t h i s  set;  so, we 
introduce some simple methods which permi ts  one t o  e a s i l y  answer questions about 
Re. To i l l u s t r a t e  the types of r e s u l t s  which now are possible, we der ive 
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condi t ions for  an a l t e rna t i ve  t o  be Borda ranked f i r s t ,  
l a s t ,  e t c .  I n  keeping w i th  a dominant theme o f  socia l  choice, these condi t ions are 
based upon how the voters ranked the p a i r s  o f  a l te rna t ives .  
2. V o t i n g  Methods 
Let  the N13 a l t e r n a t i v e s  be <al ,ar, .  ..,an). Assume t h a t  each vo te r  has 
an o rd ina l ,  complete (a11 a l t e r n a t i v e s  are inc luded i n  the rank ing) ,  t r a n s i t i v e  
rank ing  o f  the N a l t e rna t i ves .  A l i s t i n g  o f  the rank ings f o r  the vo te r s  i s  c a l l e d ' a  
' p r o f i l e ' ,  A b a l l o t i n g  o r  a v o t i n g  method i s  where the group rank ing  i s  determined 
from vo te rs '  p r o f i l e s  i n  the f o l l o w i n g  way: Given p=(w~,wr , . . ,w~) ,  W J  
p o i n t s  are t a l l i e d  f o r  a vo te r ' s  j t n  place a l t e r n a t i v e .  Then, the se t  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  are ordered accord ing t o  the sum o f  p o i n t s  each a l t e r n a t i v e  rece ives.  
T h i s  f i n a l  o rde r i ng  can be determined e i t h e r  by asse r t i ng  t h a t  the smal ler the 
t o t a l ,  the h igher  the rank ing  ( a  reversed method), or  the l a r g e r  the t o t a l ,  the 
h igher  the  rank ing  (a  monotone method). I n  the l a t t e r  case, the weights s a t i s f y  the 
cond i t i ons  t h a t  wK2wr i f  and on l y  i f  k < j ,  and t h a t  wl)wn. For  a reversed 
method, these i n e q u a l i t i e s  are reversed. For example, a p l u r a l i t y  vote i s  a 
monotone method w i t h  p = ( l , O ,  ..., 0). For s i m p l i c i t y  o f  expos i t ion ,  assume t h a t  
the WK'S are  a1 1 r a t i o n a l  numbers. (Th is  doesn't impose any p r a c t i c a l  
l i m i t a t i o n s .  The on l y  t h e o r e t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n  occurs should <WJ) be a se t  o f  
canp le te l y  i r r a t i o n a l  numbers; here, c e r t a i n  statements a s s e r t i n g  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  w i t h  i nd i f f e rence  among a l t e r n a t i v e s  may no t  ho ld .  See t7,81 f o r  
an exp lana t ion  o f  th is . )  
According t o  the above, v o t i n g  methods d i f f e r  by the choice o f  the v o t i n g  
vec to rs  used i n  the t a l l y i n g  process. However, two methods may be equiva lent  
because they always y i e l d  the same group ranking. For instance, i t  i s  c l e a r  t ha t  
the outcane of an e l e c t  ion i s  the same whether the voters '  rank ings  are t a l l  i ed  w i t h  
W_n or  w i t h  aW_n where a i s  a nonzero constant. ( I f  a i s  negat ive,  then one 
system i s  a monotone method w h i l e  the other  one i s  a reversed method.) Likewise, 
the outcome remains invar ian t  should the preferences be t a l l  ied  by us ing WN+~EN. 
Here b i s  a nonzero scalar and the complete ind i f fe rence vector EN i s  
N 1 , . . , 1 .  Consequently, 
D e f i n i t i o n  1. Two uo t i ng  uectors ~ N I  and HM2 are r a i d  t o  be equivalent i f  they 
and the uector  def ine a two dimensional l i n e a r  subspace o f  RM. 
T h i s  de f ines  an equiualence r e l a t i o n  and the equiualence classes o f  u o t i n g  
vectors and methods. I n  what fol lmus, we e x p l o i t  t h i s  equiualence by normal iz ing 
the u o t i n g  vectors. As a f i r s t  normal izat ion, we consider only  monotone u o t i n g  
methods. The fo l l ow ing  character izes an important equivalence class. 
D e f i n i t i o n  2. A Borda Count over N)3 a l t e rna t i ues  i s  where the vote t a l l y  vector,  
WN, has the proper ty  tha t  wgwg+l i s  the sure nonzero constant f o r  
- 
K=1,2,..,N-I. Denote both a Borda uector  and the equiualence c lass  of  Borda uectors 
bY p. 
Vector y1=(1,2,..,N) i s  a reversed Borda vector,  whi le  
92=(2N-2,2N-4,...,2,01 i s  a monotone Borda vector.  They both belong t o  the same 
equivalence c lass  because ~(N~EN-V_I)*Z. 
The NL3 a l t e r n a t i v e s  def ine a fami ly  o f  2N-(N+1) subsets, each o f  which has 
a t  l eas t  tuo a l te rna t ives .  For each subset, se lec t  a vo t i ng  vector.  (For the 
subsets of two a l te rna t ives ,  we can assume that  the uo t i ng  methods are the same.) 
Let  g denote these 2N-(N+1) vo t ing  vectors. Should these uectors a11 be Borda, 
denote the combined uector by B. 
A given and a choice o f  uoters' p r o f i l e s  uniquely determines the ord ina l  
rankings f o r  the 2n-(N+1) subsets. Let  Ru be the set obtained by vary ing the 
voters' p r o f i l e s  over a l l  possible choices. One o f  the main r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  paper, 
which establ ishes the super io r i t y  o f  the Borda Count, i s  given i n  the fo l lmu ing  
theorem. ( I n  t h i s  and several other statements, we assert  that  ce r ta in  conclusions 
hold f o r  'most' uo t i ng  systems. 'flost' means "almost a l l '  i n  a measure theo re t i c  
sense, or 'open-dense' i n  a topological  sense. More prec ise ly ,  i t  wi 1 1  mean a1 1 
vectors W except those where the vector components s a t i s f y  a speci f ied,  s t r i c t ,  
a lgebraic  r e l a t i o n s h i p  among each other - see Section 5. I t  i s  of  importance t o  
note t h a t  i f  g consis ts  s o l e l y  of p l u r a l i t y  vo t ina  methods. then i t  & i n  t h i s  
general c 1 ass. 
Theorem 1. 
l eas t  two a1 
t o  rank the 
L e t  N13. Consider the fami ly  of a l l  P-(N+l)  d i f f e r e n t  subsets o f  a t  
te rna t  i ues, and 1 e t  represent the co l  l e c t  ion o f  vo t  i n~ vec tors  rdop t e d  
d i f f e r e n t  subsets. Then 
I f  # g, then the f i r s t  set  s t r i c t l y  conta ins the second, Moreover, f o r  most 
choices o f  Id, Ru contains a11 possib le rankings. 
T h i s  means tha t  any vo t i ng  method other than the Borda Count admits more 
nontransi  t i ve rank i ngs than those obtained by the Borda Count. Furthermore, i t 
f o l l o w s  f r a  the s t r i c t  containment tha t  the Borda Count i s  the unique b a l l o t i n g  
r e s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h i s  socia l  choice problem. The fo l l ow ing  statement extends t h i s  
conclusion t o  subfamil ies o f  subsets o f  a l te rna t ives .  
r o l l a r y  1 . 1  Out o f  the 2N-(N+l) subsets of a t  leas t  two a l t e rna t i ves ,  se lec t  
a fami 1 Y o f  K of t helm. Le t  Y be the co l  1 ect  ion o f  the vot i ng vectors used t o  rank 
t h i s  f a m i l y  o f  subsets, and l e t  R'u be a11 possib le e lec t i on  outcanes from t h i s  
fami ly .  Then R'u contains R'e.  
We do not  assert  tha t  the f i r s t  set s t r i c t l y  contains the second one because 
there are fami 1 i e s  o f  subsets where R'u=R'e independent of  the choice o f  u. 
Often t h i s  i s  character ized by R'g conta in ing a l l  possible rankings o f  the subsets 
of  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
A second important feature o f  Theorem 1 i s  tha t ,  f o r  most choices of Y, Ru 
conta ins everyth ing!  Since any type of  inconsistency can occur, these are the worse 
systems which can be used. As asserted, p l u r a l i t y  vo t ing  i s  i n  t h i s  general c lass.  
The f o l  lowing coro l  l a r y  fo l l ows  immediately. 
Cor o  1  
f ash i 
t h a t  
l a  1.2. For each o f  the 2n-(N+l) subsets, se lec t ,  i n  an a r b i t r a r y  
on, sane rank ing  o f  the a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Then, there e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  v o t e r s  so 
t h e i r  r a n k i n g  o f  each subset i s  the s p e c i f i e d  ranking. 
Example: There e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  vo te r s  so t h a t  t h e i r  plur;! !. :I- kings 
change w i t h  the number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  e.g., the  group's p l u r a l i t y  rank ings  are 
a1 )as)aa)aq, bu t  aa>as)a~ , aq>as)a~ , aq)aa)a~ , and 
aq)aa)a2, b u t  a ~ ) a a  i f f  J<k. 
Suppose f o r  a  v o t i n g  vec to r  Hn there i s  o n l y  one choice o f  J so t h a t  
WJ-w~+1#0.  Such a  v o t i n g  system can d i s t i n g u i s h  between only  two se t s  of 
a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  e.g., j -1 charac te r i zes  the p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  vector which 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s  on l y  between the top ranked a1 t e r n a t i v e  and a1 1  o thers .  A  common1 y  
used method f o r  committee s e l e c t i o n  i s  t o  i nd i ca te  your ' top k  ranked a l t e r n a t i u e s ' .  
Again, t h i s  system d i s t i ngu i shes  between on l y  two subsets. I t  t u rns  out  t h a t  i f  a l l  
the v o t i n g  canponents o f  W d i s t i n g u i s h  on l y  between two subsets o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  
then W_ i s  i n  the general c l a s s  where any outcome can occur. Thus, the above 
c o r o l l a r y  ho lds  f o r  a l l  of these systems. 
Theorem 1 asser ts  t h a t  f o r  most systems there  need not  be any r e l a t i o n s h i p  
whatsoever between how the vo te r s  rank the va r i ous  subsets of a l t e r n a t i v e s .  But, 
f o r  o ther  systems, what type o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  can be ext racted? We s t a r t  our answer 
o f  t h i s  ques t ion  by examining the poss ib le  rank ings  o f  p a i r s  o f  a l t e r n a t i u e s .  The 
m o t i v a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i f  the group's outcome were t r a n s i t i v e ,  then the rank ing  o f  N 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  would un ique ly  e s t a b l i s h  the group's rank ings  o f  the p a i r s  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  For instance, i f  the group's r ank ing  i s  a~)az)...)an, then, t o  
preserve t r a n s i t i v i t y ,  a  m a j o r i t y  of the vo te r s  would p re fe r  a ~  t o  aJ i f  and 
on l y  i f  k < j .  
I t  has been recognized f o r  a  long t ime t ha t  t r a n s i t i v i t y  among the rank ings  o f  
p a i r s  need no t  e x i s t ;  c y c l e s  can occur. One of the o ldes t  examples, known as the 
Condorcet t r i p l e t ,  i s  where the p r o f i l e s  o f  th ree  vo te r s  are al)az)aa, 
az)a3)a1, and a3)al)az.  A simple computation shows t ha t ,  by votes o f  2 
t o  1, a l l a z ,  azlaa, bu t  a r ) a l .  The i n s i d i o u s  e f f e c t s  of such cyc l es  
have been i l l u s t r a t e d  by the p r a c t i c a l  cons idera t ions  o f  agenda man ipu la t ion ,  the 
e f f e c t s  o f  'seeding' on the conc lus ions  o f  tournaments, e tc .  (Whi le t he re  i s  a  ve ry  
l a r g e  l i t e r a t u r e  on t h i s  sub jec t ,  I suggest the re ferences [4,5,91.) The f o l l o w i n g  
theorem a s s e r t s  t h a t  there need n o t  be any r e l a t i o n s h i p  whatsoever among the 
rank ings  o f  p a i r s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  rnr outcome i s  poss ib le .  (Th i s  r e s u l t  i s  a  
s l i g h t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h a t  g iven i n  193.1 
Theorem 2. Consider the (N;2)=N(N-1)/2 p a i r s  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  Car,ar>. For 
each p a i r  of a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  the re  a r e  th ree  d i f f e r e n t  rank ingsrar )ar ,  a r<a r ,  
o r  ar-a* ( ' a ~  i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  a*'). T h i s  d e f i n e s  a  se t  o f  3(Nf23 
sequences; each of the (N;2) e n t r i e s  o f  a  sequence designates the rank ing  f o r  a  
s p e c i f i c  p a i r  of a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Any such sequence can rea l i zed ;  the re  e x i s t  voters '  
p r o f i l e s  w c h  t h a t  f o r  each p a i r  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  the designated choice r e s u l t s  by a  
mJo r i t y  vo te  for s t r i c t  pre ference and a t i e  vote  f o r  i nd i f f e rence .  That is, R'u 
can be equated w i t h  the s e t  of a1 1  poss ib l e  sequences o f  rank ings  o f  p a i r s  o f  
a1 t e r n a t  iues.  
For N-3, the Condorcet cyc l e  i s  an example o f  t h i s  theorem. For N=4, t h i s  
theorem means, f o r  instance, t h a t  a ~ ) a z ,  az)ar,  a r ) a ~ ,  a + > a ~ ,  
a2>a+, a l l  a re  r e a l i z e d  by m a j o r i t y  vo tes  from the same s e t  o f  vo te r s  p r o f i l e s  
and these same vo te r s  are evenly  s p l i t  between a r  and a+. I n  genera l ,  a11 
p o s s i b l e  cyc l es ,  subcycles, o r  any th ing  e l se  can be const ructed by  means o f  m a j o r i t y  
vote.  
T h i s  r e s u l t  imposes lower bounds on the cons is tency o f  v o t i n g  independent 
the cho ice  o f  the v o t i n a  method used t o  rank N a l t e rna t i ues .  T h i s  can be seen w i t h  
-
a p r o f i l e  o f  vo te r s  f o r  the above example. Independent o f  how these v o t e r s  rank the 
se t  o f  f o u r  a l t e r n a t i u e s ,  the outcome must be incons is ten t  w i t h  how the same vo te r s  
rank a t  l e a s t  two p a i r s  of a1 t e r n a t  ives.  (Th i s  i s  because the pa i rw i se  rank ings o f  
the two subsets (a1 ,az,asl and (a1 ,az,a+l form cycles.) T h i s  
i l l u s t r a t e s  Arrow's theorem f o r  vo t ing  methods, and i t  imposes a  lower bound on the 
degree o f  consistency which can be achieved through. voting. 
Because there need not be any re la t i onsh ip  among the rankings o f  the p a i r s  o f  
a l t e rna t i ves ,  i t  might be argued that  the search f o r  consistency should be 
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  those p r o f i l e s  where there i s  order among the ranKings o f  the pa i r s .  
The goal, then, would be t o  determine whether t h i s  re la t i onsh ip  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the 
ranking o f  the N a l te rnat ives .  For instance, cyc les need not always occur; there are 
s i t u a t i o n s  where, by m a j o r i t y  votes, ce r ta in  a l te rna t i ves  merge as c lear  favo r i t es ,  
or as c l e a r  losers. Such a l te rnat ives ,  which were i d e n t i f i e d  by Condorcet, o f ten  
are used as the standard fo r  comparison f o r  the consistency of a  vo t i ng  method. 
D e f i n i t i o n  3. A l te rna t i ve  ag i s  c a l l e d  a  Condorcet winner i f  i n  a11 possib le 
pai rwise comparisons u i t h  the other a l te rnat ives ,  ag always u i n s  by a  m a j o r i t y  
vote. A l t e r n a t i v e  a r  i s  c a l l e d  a  Condorcet loser  i f  i n  a11 possible pai rwise 
comparisons u i t h  the other a l ternat ives,  ag always loses by a  ma jo r i t y  vote. 
For consistency, a  vo t i ng  method should rank a  Condorcet winner i n  f i r s t  place 
and a  Condorcet loser i n  l a s t  place. But, t h i s  need not be the case; the 
in t roductory  example demonstrates, and i t  f o l l ows  i n  general from Corol lary 1.2, 
tha t  p l u r a l i t y  vo t ing  can rank the Condorcet winner i n  l a s t  place and the Condorcet 
loser  i n  f i r s t  place. The next theorem asserts tha t ,  w i t h  the exception o f  the Borda 
Count, t h i s  and much worse phenomena can occur f o r  vot ing method. On1 y  the 
Borda Count always r e f l e c t s  the rankings o f  the p a i r s  of a l te rnat ives .  
Theorem 3. Let  N)3 a l t e r n a t i v e s  k given, and l e t  WN be a  vo t ing  method t o  rank 
the N  a l te rna t i ves .  Consider the re la t ionsh ip  between the rankings of the N  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  and the (N;2) p a i r s  o f  a l te rnat ives .  I f  p # p ,  then R'u 
conta ins a1 1  possib le cambinat ions of the rankings o f  p a i r s  of a1 ternat  iues and the 
ranking. o f  the N  a l te rnat ives .  The Borda uector, BN, never ranks a  Condorcet 
winner i n  l a s t  place, nor a  Condorcet loser i n  f i r s t  place. There i s  no vo t i ng  
system which always ranks the Condorcet winner i n  f i r s t  place and the Condorcet 
loser  i n  l a s t  place. 
Thus, w i t h  the exception of the Borda Count, there need not be any re la t i onsh ip  
whatsoever between the rank ings o f  p a i r s  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  and the rank ings  o f  the N 
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  I n  o ther  words, even when we r e s t r i c t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  those p r o f i l e s  
where t he re  i s  order i n  the rank ings o f  p a i r s ,  we don't f i n d  added c o n s i s t e n c ~  w i t h  
the r a n k i n g  o f  the N a l t e rna t i ves .  Indeed, the f o l l o w i n g  statement d i sp lays  an 
extreme s i t u a t i o n  where the p a i r s  do possess order ,  but  i t  i s  a t  odds w i t h  the 
r a n k i n g  o f  the  N a l t e rna t i ues .  
C o r o l l a r y  3.1. Suppose t h a t  N13 and t h a t  the adopted v o t i n g  vector ,  p, i s  n o t  a 
Borck vector .  Then there e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  v o t e r s  so that ,  by r l j o r i t y  votes, the  
p a i r s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a re  ranked a ~ > a r  i f  and o n l y  i f  j <k .  Yet, t h e i r  Wn 
r a n k i n g  o f  the  N a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  the reve rsa l :  an)an-~>...)a~. 
3. A V e c t o r  Space Approach 
Al though the above statements demonstrate the s u p e r i o r i t y  of the Borda Count 
over o the r  v o t i n g  methods, they do no t  adequately descr ibe Re nor Ru. To remedy 
t h i s ,  we need a more complete d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  v o t i n g  systems. We s t a r t  by r e l a t i n g  
c a r d i n a l  rank ings  w i t h  o rd i na l  rank ings.  
I n  the  N dimensional space RM, i d e n t i f y  the kTn component xu w i t h  the 
kTn a l t e r n a t i v e  aa. A vector  ~ ( x I , . . , x M )  can be i n te rp re ted  as a ca rd ina l  
r a n k i n g  o f  the N a l t e r n a t i u e s  where l a rge r  values o f  xu denote 'stronger '  
preference f o r  au. The hyperplane xa=xr d i v i d e s  RM i n t o  three reg ions;  the 
two open reg ions  denote s t r i c t  o rd i na l  preference (e.g., xa)xr corresponds t o  
where a r  i s  p re fe r red  t o  o r ) ,  and the hyperplane corresponds t o  i nd i f f e rence  
between the  two a1 t e rna t  iues. By a1 lowing k and j t o  vary  over a l l  poss ib le  
(N;2)=N(N-1)/2 p a i r s  of indices, the (N;2) hyperplanes d i v i d e  RM i n t o  reg ions  
rep resen t i ng  a l l  poss ib le  o rd i na l  rank ings o f  the N a l t e r n a t i v e s .  A connected open 
s e t  i s  a ' rank ing  regions'  w i t h  s t r i c t  preferences among a l t e r n a t i u e s ;  those reg ions  
conta ined i n  the hyperplanes are rank ing  reg ions  w i t h  i nd i f f e rence  among o r  between 
sane o f  the a l te rnat iues .  The l i n e  passing through 1 and EN corresponds t o  
complete ind i f fe rence among the a l te rnat  iues; t h i s  1 ine i s  the in tersec t  ion o f  the 
(N;2) ' ind i f fe rence '  hyperplanes. 
Le t  A denote the ranking a ~ ) a ~ ) . . ) a ~ .  I f  WN i s  a vo t ing  method, then, 
because i t  i s  a monotone method, i t  i s  i n  the closure o f  the ranking region of A. 
( I f  any two o f  the canponents o f  WN are the same, t h i s  uector i s  on the boundary; 
otherwise, i t  i s  i n  the i n te r io r . )  Vector W_n represents the t a l l y  f o r  a uoter 
w i t h  preference giuen by A. Denote t h i s  dependency by pa. Any other ranking o f  
the N a1 ternat iues  i s  a permutation o f  A, P(A). The t a l l y  f o r  the ranking of such a 
uoter i s  a permutation o f  WMa; denote i t  by WNpta). (bJNpta) i s  i n  the closure 
of the rank ing region defined by P(AI.1 I f  there are n'pta) voters w i th  the 
ranking P(A), then the f i n a l  t a l l y  i s  
3.1 n'r (a )U"? (a 
where the summation index, P(A), ranges ouer N! permutations o f  A. The group 
ranking i s  determined by the ranking region which contains t h i s  sum. 
The rank ing i s  inuar iant  should the sum be d iv ided by n, the t o t a l  number o f  
uoters. I f  nrca)=n'rca)/n i s  the f r a c t i o n  o f  the voters w i th  ranking P(A), then 
the rum becomes 
3.2 f n~ tn )W_nrcn )~  
Because the uar iab les  CNp(a)l are non-negatiue and sun t o  un i t y ,  Eq. 3.2 can 
be in te rp re ted  as representing a convex canbinat ion of the uectors C p r t a ) l .  Th i s  
set i s  i n  the a f f i n e  plane containing these uectors. Our analys is  i s  s i m p l i f i e d  
when t h i s  plane i s  a l i n e a r  subspace o f  RN. This motiuates the fo l lou ing .  
Vector Normalizat ion Assumption: The rum of the camponentr of a vot ing  uector 
equals zero. 
Examples: a) The standard uector f o r  p l u r a l i t y  vo t i ng  ouer N a l te rnat iues  i s  
l , O , . , O .  A normalized uector i s  (N-1,-1,-I,..,-1). 
b) For k 2 ,  we always use (1,-1). 
T h i s  assumption f o r ces  the v o t i n g  vec to r s  and the sum i n  Eq. 3.2 t o  be i n  the 
l i n e a r  subspace o f  RN which i s  orthogonal  t o  EN. Denote t h i s  N-1 dimensional 
subspace by  EN. For b 3 ,  the r ank ing  reg ions  o f  E3 are g iven i n  F igure  1. 
For k=2,...,N-1, consider a  subset o f  k  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and l e t  WK be the 
v o t i n g  method adopted t o  rank t h i s  subset o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  For any vo te r ' s  r a n k i n g  
o f  t h i s  subset,  the t a l l y  o f  the b a l l o t  i s  g iven b y  the appropr ia te  permutat ion o f  
the components o f  WK. However, t h i s  permutat i on  o f  - W K -  a l s o  can -be indexed by 
how t h i s  v o t e r  ranks a l l  N a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  n o t  j u s t  t h i s  r e l evan t  subset. So, f o r  any 
permuta t ion  o f  A, l e t  WKrtn) be the unique permutat ion o f  W K  which corresponds 
t o  how the s p e c i f i e d  k  a l t e r n a t i v e s  are ranked i n  P(A). For instance, suppose W4, 
k=3, and the s p e c i f i e d  r ank ing  i s  al)an)a3. There are f o u r  cho ices o f  P(A) 
which preserve t h i s  r ank ing  -- they a re  the f o u r  ways i n  which a4 can be 
p o s i t i o n e d  w i t h i n  t h i s  r ank ing  o f  three a l t e r n a t i u e s .  Thus, f o r  e x a c t l y  f o u r  
d i f f e r e n t  cho ices  of the subsc r i p t  P(A), the vec to r s  bJ3rtn) agree and represent  
the vo te  t a l l y  f o r  the sane rank ing  o f  the three a1 t e rna t i ves .  
L e t  (N;k) represent  the usual combinator ic  s m b o l  (f) Each rank ing  o f  k  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  preserved i n  p r e c i s e l y  (N;N-k)=(N;k) d i f f e r e n t  permutat ions o f  P(A), 
so the  vec to r  WKrtn) i s  g iven by (N;k) d i f f e r e n t  subsc r i p t s  P(4). The group's 
r a n k i n g  of these a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  g iven by the rank ing  reg ion  o f  EK which con ta ins  
t h ~  vec to r  sum 
3.3 I: n~ ( A  ) W K t  ( A )  a 
To model how the same vo te r s  would rank the N a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i t h  the method WN 
and a subset o f  k  a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i t h  the method W K ,  we use the space ENxEK. 
The r a n k i n g  reg ions  i n  t h i s  product space a re  given by the product  o f  r ank i ng  
r e g i o n s  i n  the canponent spaces. The outcome i s  the r ank ing  reg ion  which con ta ins  
the vec to r  sum 
3.4 ~ n r c n ) ( W N r ~ a ) , W K r c a ) ) .  
I f  E(W_N,WK) ,  t h i s  can be represented by the sum 
3.5 nrca)Wrca) 
Th is  equation has an in te rp re ta t i on  s im i la r  t o  tha t  o f  Eq. 3.2, and the sum i s  i n  
the convex h u l l  o f  the vectors {Wp ta ) ) .  To understand what nont rans i t i ve  outcanes 
can r e s u l t ,  we need t o  k n a  which ranking regions meet t h i s  convex set. 
A unique l i n e a r  subspace i s  spanned by the convex set def ined i n  Eq 3.5. What 
s i m p l i f i e s  our analys is  i s  that  both the l i n e a r  subspace and the convex h u l l  meet 
the same rank ing regions o f  EnxEK. (This w i l l  be sham i n  Section 5.)  
Therefore, the task of determining the elements o f  R'u i s  equivalent t o  
determining which ranking regions o f  ENxEK meet the l inear  subspace spanned by 
the vectors CWrta~) = {(Wnrta),WKcta))l. Denote t h i s  subspace by V U .  
Moreover, the dimension o f  the convex set and V U  are the same, so t h i s  carmon 
dimension serves as another measure of the number of nont rans i t i ve  group rankings 
which can occur. 
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  Theorem 2 w i l l  be expressed i n  terms o f  the vector space 
V u .  For t h i s ,  and fu tu re  statements, we impose the fo l lowing ordering on the 
l i s t i n g  of the (N;2) p a i r s  o f  a l ternat ives:  A given p a i r  (ar,ar) i s  l i s t e d  w i t h  
index j < k .  The p a i r s  are l i s t e d  i n  the order k=j+I,..,N,j=l,..,N-1; i.e., 
a , a ,  . .  , a a  a a  , a - a  Each p a i r  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  (ar ,ar) ,  j<k ,  i s  represented by a space Ez where, because o f  the 
ordering, the vector (1,-1) indicates that  ar i s  p re fer red t o  ar .  Thus, the 
space o f  a l l  p a i r s  i s  represented by (Ez) (n)z ) ,  and the above imposes an 
order ing on t h i s  space. 
Theorem 4. Consider a l l  (N;2) p a i r s  of a l te rnat iues ,  and l e t  k be the vector of 
v o t i n ~  methods. Then UP i s  the t o t a l  space (Ez)tN;z), and i t  has dimension 
<N;2). 
Since Vp agrees w i th  the space (Ez)(Nfz ' ,  i t  meets each o f  the ranking 
regions. Thus, Theorem 2 fo l lows.  The importance o f  the dimension o f  Vp i s  t ha t  
i t  imposes a lower bound on the dimension of Vu when r e s u l t s  are compared over a l l  
2N-(N+1) subsets o f  a l te rna t ives .  Th i s  i s  because when Vu i s  computed, i t  must 
r e f l e c t  t h i s  freedom from consistency among the rankings of  pa i r s .  Thus, a lower 
bound the dimension qf Vu fpy a aeneral problem i s  (N;2). 
When d i f f e r e n t  se ts  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  are ranked, the subspace Vu can vary 
depending on the scalar  normal izat ions adopted f o r  the vo t i ng  components o f  W_. For 
instance, the space spanned by the permutations o f  the vo t ing  vectors 
(3,1,-1,-3;1,0,-1) and (3,1,-1,-3;5,0,-5) d i f f e r  even though i n  both cases the set 
o f  4 and the se t  o f  3 a l t e r n a t i v e s  are ranked by Borda Counts. (As we have shown, 
the rank ing  regions which meet these two subspaces are the same.) So, t o  compare 
vector  spaces, we need t o  impose a scalar  normal izat ion. Because other vo t ing  
vec tors  w i l l  be compared w i t h  the Borda Count, the only  standards we impose are f o r  
*2 and f o r  the Borda Count; the normal izat ion f o r  the other vectors w i l l  be 
determined as needed. 
Scalar Normal izat ion Assumption: For N)3 a l te rna t ives ,  the normalized Borda vector 
i s  N - l . , N + l - 2 i , l  The v o t i n g  vector  used f o r  N=2 i s  (1,-1). 
Example: For b 4 ,  the Borda vector i s  (3,1,-1,-3). 
BY tak ing  a vector approach and by standar iz ing the Borda Count, sharper 
conclus ions are possible. To i l l u s t r a t e  th i s ,  an improvement o f  Theorem 3 f o l l ~ s .  
Here we are comparing the ranking o f  the N a l t e rna t i ves  w i t h  the rankings o f  the 
p a i r s  of a1 ternat iues,  so the space i s  EHx(Ez)tHjz). The f i r s t  vo t i ng  
component o f  w(W_N,F) ranks the N a l te rna t ives .  The remaining vo t i ng  components 
rank the p a i r s  o f  a l t e rna t i ves  where 11 i s  the vector i n  Theorem 4. 
Def ine the vectors <znwl ,  K=l,..,n, i n  Enx(EZ)(Nit) i n  the fo l l ow ing  
way. The E N  component o f  has the value -(N-1)/N i n  the kTH component, and 
l / N  i n  a11 o thers .  The Ez component o f  ~ N K  i s zero  i f  t h i s  component space Ez 
does n o t  represen t  a  p a i r  which inc ludes ax. I f  E2 represents  ( a r , a ~ ) ,  the 
component i s  (1,-1) if k < j ,  otherwise i t  i s  (-1,1). T h i s  choice r e f l e c t s  t h a t  a r  
i s  the p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e .  
These k c  t o r s  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  the f 01 1 owi ng manner. The camponen t s  i n  
(Ez ) tN i z )  des ignate t h a t  a r  i s  a  Condorcet winner.  The EN component 
des igna tes  t h a t  a r  i s  ranked i n  l a s t  p lace  w h i l e  a11 o ther  a l t e r n a t i v e s  are t i e d  
f o r  f i r s t .  For W 3 ,  these vec to r s  are Z~,I=(-2/3,1/3,1/3;1,-l;lj-i;O,O), 
&,z=(1/3,-2/3,1/3;-1,1;0,0;1 ,-I), and &,3=(1/3,1/3,-2/3;-1,1;0,0;-1 ,I), 
Theorem 5. Assume the hypothes is  o f  Theorem 3. I f  gN#p,  then Vu i s  the 
t o t a l  space ENx(EzI(MiZ). The space VB i s  a (N;2) dimensional space 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by the normal uec to r s  < ~ N K ) . .  
I t  i s  remarkable t h a t  the dimension o f  UB equals  the t heo rec t i c  lower bound 
of (N;2)! I t  i s  impossible t o  do b e t t e r  w i t hou t  e l i m i n a t i n g  the rank ings  o f  p a i r s ,  
so t h i s  i s  another argument suppor t ing  the s u p e r i o r i t y  of the Borda Count. 
Because we can't do b e t t e r  than the Borda Count, we need t o  know these rank ings  
which cannot be avoided. Any such rank ing  de f i nes  a  s e t  of vec to r s  f rom a rank ing  
reg ion .  T h i s  r ank ing  i s  Borda adn i ss i b l e  i f  and o n l y  i f  a t  l e a s t  one vector  f r a n  
t h i s  s e t  i s  orthogonal  t o  o f  the ZNK vectors.  The proof of the f o l l o w i n g  
statement i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s .  The f i r s t  asse r t i on  improves upon Theorem 3 because i t  
r e l a x e s  the c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  an a l t e r n a t i v e  must be a Condorcet winner t o  avo id  be ing  
Borda ranked l a s t .  The second statement i l l u s t r a t e s  how Theorem 5 can be used t o  
f i n d  s u f f i c i e n t  cond i t i ons  f o r  an a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  be Borda ranked f i r s t .  Rela ted 
r e s u l t s  a re  e a s i l y  der ived. 
Coro l l a ry  5.1. a) Let  f(k,, j) be the d i f ference between the f rac t i ons  of the 
vo ters  r e f e r r i n g  ar t o  ar and those p r e f e r r i n g  ar t o  a&. I f  
F ( k ) = f f ( k , j l  i s  pos i t i ve ,  ar rill not be Borda ranked i n  l a s t  place, nor t i e d  
f o r  l a d t  place. I f  FM(k) i s  negative, ar w i l l  not be Borda ranked i n  f i r s t  
place, nor t i e d  f o r  f i r s t  place. 
b) I f  FM(l))N-2, then a1 i s  Borda ranked i n  f i r s t  place. If FM(l)<2+4, 
then a1 i s  Borda ranked i n  l a s t  place. 
I f  ar i s  a Condorcet winner, then f(k,j))O f o r  a11 choices of j. T r i v i a l l y ,  
FN(k)>O, so ar  cannot be Borda ranked l a s t .  Hawever, i t  i s  easy t o  construct 
examples where an a l t e r n a t i v e  ar  has F(k)>O even though i t  isn' t  a Condorcet 
winner. Thus, t h i s  r e s u l t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  improves upon Theorem 3. These inequa l i t i es  
are reversed i f  ar i s  a Condorcet loser.  
What we r e a l l y  want are necessary and su f f i c i en t  condi t ions f o r  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
t o  be Borda ranked i n  k T n  place, k=l,..,N, based upon how the voters rank the 
p a i r s  o f  a l t e rna t i ves .  Th is  can't be done based s o l e l y  upon the ord ina l  rankings of 
the pa i r s ,  but i t  can w i t h  the added information of how dec is ive ly  each a l t e r n a t i v e  
won or l o s t  i n  the pairwise comparisions. The fo l l ow ing  statement describes the 
close 1 ink between the Borda Count and the rankings of the pai rs .  
Coro l l a ry  5.2. Given a p r o f i l e  o f  voters, compute Fn(k), k=l,..,N. The Borda 
t a l l y  i s  (Fn(l),F(2),..,Fn<N)). Thus, the algebraic ranking o f  <FM(k)l 
detern ines the Borda ranking o f  <at). 
The Borda ranking r e f l e c t s  how dec is ive ly  an a l te rna t i ve  fa res  i n  the pairwise 
comparisons w i t h  the other a l te rnat ives .  From th i s ,  a case can be made tha t  
Borda winner i s  preferable t o  a Condorcet winner. One support ing argument i s  tha t  a 
-
Borda outcane i s  robust wh i le  a Condorcet winner need not be. For instance, i t  i s  
easy t o  construct  examples where a1 i s  the Condorcet winner by v i r t u e  o f  bare ly  
winning m a j o r i t y  votes over a2 and ag, yet a2 wins dec is ive ly  over a3. 
Here, a2 emerges as the Borda winner. Now, a s l i g h t  change i n  the voters' 
rankings o f  a1 and as would change the Condorcet winner t o  a2, but i t  wouldn't 
a f f e c t  the Borda ranking. The reason, o f  course, i s  that a Condorcet winner i s  
determined by o r d i n a l  rank ings wh i l e  a  Borda outcome r e f l e c t s  the s t r eng th  o f  a  
pa i rw ise  v i c t o r y .  A s i m i l a r  type o f  robustness argument charac te r i zes  the 
s i t u a t i o n s  when a Condorcet winner isn ' t  Borda ranked f i r s t .  
Proof of the C o r o l l a r i e s .  Proof o f  C o r o l l a r y  5.2. For a  given p r o f i l e  o f  
voters ,  the  outcame over the se t  o f  N a l t e r n a t i v e s  and the (N;2) p a i r s  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  g iven by the rank ing  reg ion  which con ta ins  the sum 
3.6 n r  (a ( a )  
where e(BN,P) i s  the normal ized Borda vector  i n  ENx(EZ)(Nlfl. Le t  the EN 
component o f  t h i s  vector  ( t he  Borda outcane) be g iven by (XI,..,XN). Because 
Eq. 3.6 i s  an adn i ss i b l e  outcome, t h i s  vector  sum i s  orthogonal t o  & w l  k=l,..,N. 
Take t h i s  s c a l a r  product.  The value o f  t h a t  p a r t  o f  the sca lar  product r e s u l t i n g  
from the EN components i s  ( - X K ( N - ~ ) / N ) + ( ~ ( X J / N ) .  But,  because o f  the vec to r  i @lr 
norma l i za t ion ,  Zx r=0 ,  so ~xJ/N=-xK/N. Thus, the c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  the sca la r  
;&R 
product f rom the EN components i s  - X K .  
Because o f  the form o f  & K ,  the p a r t  o f  the sca la r  product corresponding t o  
the space (E2) tN jz )  i s  FN(k). Thus, the o r t h o g o n a l i t y  cond i t i on  leads t o  the 
des i red  conc 1 us i on 
3.7 xw = FN(k), 
T h i s  campletes the proof  o f  the Co ro l l a r y  5.2. 
Proof o f  C o r o l l a r y  5.1. Par t  a. Because f ( j , k )= - f (k , j ) ,  ZFN(K)=O. So, 
e i t h e r  a11 o f  the FM(k)'s are zero ( the  group's rank ing  i s  complete i nd i f f e rence ) ,  
o r  there  a re  some which are p o s i t i v e  and sane which are negat ive.  I n  the l a t t e r  
case, i f  FN(k)lO, then i t  f o l l o w s  from Coro l l a r y  5.2 t h a t  aw can't be Borda 
ranked l a s t ,  nor t i e d  f o r  l a s t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  FN(k)iO, can't be Borda ranked 
f i r s t ,  nor t i e d  f o r  f i r s t .  
Par t  b. This proof involves nothing more than showing that  FNtl))N-2 impl ies 
tha t  FNt1))FNtk). To do t h i s ,  we need to.determine the maximum values fo r  the 
xr's. To i l l u s t r a t e  the ideas, we r e s t r i c t  a t ten t i on  t o  M 3 ;  the proof f o r  N13 i s  
s i m i l a r .  
Assume that  FB(1))l. The vector outcome i n  Eq. 3.8 must be i n  the convex 
h u l l  o f  the 6 permutations o f  the Borda vector (2,0,-2). T r i v i a l l y ,  the maximum 
values fo r  the xr 's occur on the boundary of t h i s  set. Because F3(1))0, a1 
must be ranked e i the r  f i r s t  o r  second, and e i t h e r  a2 or  a3 occupies the other 
top two pos i t ions .  Assume wi thout  loss  o f  genera l i t y  that  a1 and a2 are the top 
two r a t e d  a l te rnat ives .  Th is  assumption determines an edge o f  the convex h u l l :  
t(2,0,-2)+(1-t)(0,2,-2) = (2t,2-2t,-21, where O(tL1. The assumption F3(1))1 
forces t)1/2, which i n  tu rn  forces the ranking t o  have at i n  f i r s t  place. This 
completes the proof. For N)3, other r e s u l t s  fo l l ow  by usinq the surfaces of the 
convex h u l l  ra ther  than j u s t  the edges. 
We end t h i s  sect ion w i th  our main r e s u l t .  
Theorem 6. Let  N13 a1 te rnat iues  be giuen. Consider the fami ly  of a1 1 2n-(Ntl) 
subsets o f  a t  leas t  two a1 ternat  iues. Let  T be the space 
En~..x(EK)tMj~)x..~(Ez)~Mjz). For each subset of al ternat iues,  se lec t  a 
v o t i n g  method, and l e t  i n  T be the vector cons is t ing  o f  a11 of the uo t ing  methods. 
a) Any & has a normalizat ion so tha t  VB i s  a l i nea r  rubspace o f  Vu. I f  
W l ,  then VB i s  a proper subspace. 
b) Vm i s  a (Nj2) dimensional l i n e a r  subspace o f  T. The normal vectors for 
VI are found i n  the f o l  lowing manner. For each subset of k a1 ternat  iues, the 
vec tors  <ZKJ) are defined. Thew vectors can be extended t o  T by a l l w i n g  the new 
uector  camponents t o  be the zero uectors. The set o f  a l l  such vectors span the 
1 inear space which i s  normal t o  VB. 
C) For most choicer of Id, VU=T. 
Theorem 1 and Corol l a r y  1.1 are special cases o f  Statement a. Theorems 4 and 5 
have imposed a lower bound on the dimension o f  VB; the remarkable fac t  i s  tha t  
even though we are considering a11 possible subsets of a l te rnat ives ,  the dimension 
o f  VE has no t  changed; i t  s t i l l  equals (N;2). T h i s  again demonstrates the 
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the Borda vectors .  Because the normal vec to rs  t o  We, are spec i f i ed ,  
the elements i n  Re can be computed i n  manner s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  given above. Th is ,  
then, c o n s t i t u t e s  a simple t oo l  t o  determine poss ib l e  Borda ranKings. 
If f o r  same subset o f  k a l t e r n a t i v e s  the appropr ia te  camponent o f  B i s  r ep laced  
w i t h  another v o t i n g  vector ,  then the dimension o f  the new vector  space increases by  
- 1  E s s e n t i a l l ~ ,  the new vector  space i s  VB augmented by EK i n  the 
app rop r i a te  space. T h i s  i s  one way i n  which the VU spaces come about. A second 
way, which w i l l  be discussed i n  the sec t i on  on p roo fs ,  i s  where there i s  a a l i n e a r  
cambinat ion between the v o t i n g  methods a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  which are o f  a very  
s p e c i f i c  type. 
I n  Sec t ion  2, we s t a t e d  t ha t  p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  scheme i s  i n  t h i s  general c l a s s  
o f  'most' v o t i n g  systems. Thus 
Corol  l o r y  6.1. Assume the hypothes is  o f  Theorem 6. I f  a1 1 of the v o t i n g  cunponents 
of W correspond t o  the p l u r a l i t y  u o t i n g  scheme, then VU = T. 
From t h i s  c o r o l l a r y ,  i t  f o l l ows  t h a t  there  e x i s t  voters '  p r o f i l e s  l ead ing  to,  
say, the p l u r a l  i t y  ranKings a1 )az)a3)a4, a4)ar)az, a1 )ai)a4, 
PI )aa=a4, a q ) a ~ ) a j ,  w h i l e  the p a i r s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  are ranked as g iven 
i n  the example f o l l o w i n g  Theorem 2. O f  course, t h i s  same conclusion ho lds  f o r  any g 
where the canponent v o t i n g  vec to rs  d i s t i n g u i s h  o n l y  between two subsets o f  
a1 t e r n a t  ives.  
I f  N=3, a1 1 of the Borda rank ings can be obta ined by use o f  Theorem 5. I f  W4, 
then the normal space t o  VB i s  n ine dimensional. T h i s  increased dimension means 
t h a t  there  are a l a rge  number of incons is ten t  rank ings  which are not  Borda adnritted. 
Indeed, the numbers are so large,  t ha t  a s imple l i s t i n g  would not  be reasonable. 
But, q u a l i t a t i v e  r e s u l t s  of the nature given i n  C o r o l l a r i e s  5.1 and 5.2 are poss ib le  
by us ing  the same type o f  methods. 
Coro l l a ry  6.2. For a  given p r o f i l e  of voters, the Borda rankings o f  a  subset of k 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  C i s  given by the algebraic rankings o f  ~ ~ c ( j ) = t f ( j , i )  where the 
w m a t  i on  i s  over i # j  , i , jrC. 
Example. To i l l u s t r a t e  th i s ,  we f i r s t  show how a  Condorcet winner over a  
spec i f i c  subset of a l t e rna t i ves  fa res  over other subsets. Suppose tha t  N=4 and th.at 
a1 f o r  j-2,3 by ma jo r i t y  votes. BY the above resu l t s ,  a1 can't be Borda 
ranked l a s t  i n  subset Ca~,az,aol. But, j u s t  f r a n  the knowledge tha t  
a ~ ) a a ,  i t  fo1  lows that  independent of how the group ranks a1 and a, a1 
can't be Borda ranked i n  f i r s t  place i n  Cal,az,a4> whi le Borda ranked l a s t  i n  
the t o t a l  set .  This i s  because the f i r s t  cond i t ion  impl ies that  
F3(l)=f(1,2)+f(1,4)M, whi le the second cond i t ion  impl ies that  
F~( l )=F3(1)+ f (1 ,3)<0.  Because f(1,3))0, t h i s  i s  a  contradict ion.  
We conclude t h i s  sect ion w i t h  a  c m e n t  concerning the p r o b a b i l i t y  tha t  an 
incons is tent  ranking occurs. The p r o f i l e  of voters are represented by the sets 
Cnrta11. Thus, because they sum t o  u n i t y ,  they can be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  the 
r a t i o n a l  p o i n t s  i n  the pos i t i ve  or thant  o f  a  N!-1 dimensional space. Assume that  
the p r o f i l e s  o f  voters are d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  such a  manner that  the r a t i o n a l  po in ts  i n  
any open se t  i n  t h i s  space has pos i t i ve  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  occurring. Then, i t  turns 
out t h a t  f o r  any choice o f  W, pnr achiss ib le aroup rankinas w i t h  s t r i c t  preference 
be tween the a1 ternat  i ves has a  pos i t i  ve ~ r o b a b i  1  i t v  fi occurr i nq. 
T h i s  can be proved by a  simple vector analys is  argument s i m i l a r  t o  that  given 
above but  w i t h  W_ instead o f  a. An a l te rna t i ve ,  geanetric approach i s  t o  note tha t  
the outcomes are given by convex combinations of the vectors Cgrta,> where the 
( r a t i o n a l )  c o e f f i c i e n t s  indicate the number o f  voters w i th  each ranking o f  the 
a l te rna t i ves .  As we w i l l  see, i f  t h i s  convex h u l l  on VU meets a  ranking region 
w i t h  s t r i c t  preferences, then t h i s  in tersec t ion  forms an open subset o f  Vu. From 
t h i s  i t  fo l lows immediately that  1) there are an i n f i n i t e  number o f  examples, 
indeed, the examples correspond t o  the r a t i o n a l  p o i n t s  i n  an open se t  o f  N!-1 space, 
2) the examples need o n l y  s a t i s f y  i n e q u a l i t y  cons t ra i n t s ,  and 3) as the number o f  
vo te rs ,  n, approaches i n f i n i t y ,  then the p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  such a  ranKing occurs  
approachs a  p o s i t i v e  l i m i t  (which i s  determined by t h i s  open s e t  i n  N!-1 space). 
4. Sane Extensions 
The purpose o f  t h i s  sec t i on  i s  t o  extend the above r e s u l t s  i n  two d i f f e r e n t  
d i r e c t i o n s .  The f i r s t  i s  t o  a d n i t  a d d i t i o n a l  v o t i n g  methods over a  f i x e d  s e t  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  determine how adverse of an e f f e c t  t h i s  has on cons is tency.  The 
second i s  t o  determine whether there are f a m i l i e s  o f  subsets which a d n i t  more 
cons is tency  among the rank ings  than suggested above. 
I n  Sec t ion  2, a  s tandard equivalence r e l a t i o n  f o r  v o t i n g  methods was given. 
The bas i c  idea was t h a t  two methods are equiua lent  should they y i e l d  the same group 
r a n k i n g  f o r  any choice o f  voters '  p r o f i l e s .  But, i s  t h i s  the best  one can do; does 
t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  capture a11 o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which preserve t h i s  invar iance  o f  
group outcome? We show t h a t  i f  two v o t i n g  methods are n o t  equ iva len t  accord ing t o  
t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  then there  e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  vo te r s  where the outcomes d i f f e r .  
Indeed, much more can occur; should  there be several  v o t i n g  methods which cannot be 
cannot be expressed i n  terms o f  each o ther ,  then the same p r o f i l e  of v o t e r s  can l ead  
t o  t o t a l l y  un re l a ted  group rankings. 
D e f i n i t i o n  4 L81. L e t  <WNJ), j=l,..,k, be a  s e t  o f  k  v o t i n g  vec to r s  used t o  rank 
N a l t e r n a t i v e s .  They a re  s a i d  t o  be 'completely d i f f e r e n t '  if they and the vector  
EN a r e  l i n e a r l y  independent. 
I f  the v o t i n g  vec to r s  a re  vector  normalized, then we don't need t o  use EN. 
When k=2, the asse r t  ion t h a t  two vo t  i n9  methods are completely d i f f e r e n t  means t h a t  
they are not equivalent i n  the sense of D e f i n i t i o n  1. The next theorem asserts tha t  
i f  there are k  completely d i f f e r e n t  vot ing vectors, there need not be any 
re la t i onsh ip  msrlg the same group's rankings of the same a l te rnat iues .  Our 
asser t ion tha t  D e f i n i t i o n  1  captures a11 o f  the re la t i onsh ips  leading t o  invariance 
of outcomes fo l l ows  f o r  k=2. 
Theorem 7 t81. Let  < F a ) ,  J=l,P,..,k<N be a  wt o f  k  c a p l e t e l y  d i f f e ren t  uo t ing  
methods t o  rank a  set of N13 al ternat iues.  Let  T' be the space (EM)#  and l e t  @ 
haue PJ as i t s  j r@ vector component, j=l,..,k. Then VurT'. That i s ,  select 
any k  ord ina l  rankings o f  the N al ternat iues.  Then there e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  of voters  
so that  when the same uoters  rank the N a l te rna t iues  by using the jTu vo t i ng  
method, the outcome i s  the J T ~  selected ranking, J=l, ..,I(. 
Even the Borda vector doesn't provide any &.  . .  This i s  b e c c  - -  t h e  
Borda vector derives i t s  pawer from i t s  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  i n te rac t i on  e f fec ts  over 
subsets o f  a l te rnat iues ;  here we are considering only one subset of a l ternat iues.  
As an example, there e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  of voters so tha t  t h e i r  Borda ranking i s  
a~)az)aa)a+,  t h e i r  p l u r a l i t y  ranking i s  a+)aa)az)al, and t h e i r  
ranking by designat ing the top two a l te rnat ives  (weight vector (1,1,0,0) w i t h  a  
normal i z a t i o n  o f  (1,1,-1 ,-I)) i s  as)a+)a~)az. 
I n  the previous sect ion, the value (N;2) arose both as the dimension of the 
subspace o f  p a i r s  o f  a l t e rna t i ves  and as the dimension o f  UB. From t h i s  and 
Theorem 5, i t  may appear that  the social  choice problems are caused by the 
inconsistencies i n  the rankings of p a i r s  o f  a l ternat iues.  Should t h i s  be so, then 
i t  would be natura l  t o  ignore the b inar ies;  namely, i n  the i n te res t  o f  f i n d i n g  added 
consistency, perhaps the usual binary relevancy condi t ion should be replaced w i  t h  a  
k - fo ld  releuancy condi t ion.  However, i t  turns out tha t  there i s  no advantage i n  
doing t h i s .  For instance, i f  at ten t ion  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  only t o  the subsets o f  k  
a1 te rnat ives ,  the minimal dimension value of (N;2) s t i  11  i s  obtained by a  Borda 
Count, and i t  i s  larger  f o r  any other vot ing method. However, there are. fami l ies 
where the dimension of Us i s  smaller than (N;2). They are character ized a t  the 
end o f  t h i s  sect ion. 
Theorem 8. Let N>3 a l te rna t iues  be giuen, and l e t  k be such that  2<K<N. Consider 
the (N;k) subsets o f  k a l te rnat iues ,  and l e t  W_KJ be the uo t ing  method used t o  rank 
the j T M  set,  j=l,..,(N;k). Le t  u, a uector i n  T 0 ~ 4 E K ) ~ M j ~ ,  haue UKJ as i t s  
j t n  vector camponen t . Then, 
a) VB i s  a (N;2) dimensional subspace o f  T'. 
b) I f  -UfB_, then VB i s  a proper subset of Vu. 
BY use o f  the methods deueloped i n  Section 5, i t  isn' t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  show, f o r  
instance, tha t  i f  k=3 and i f  a t  most one o f  the components o f  & i s  a Borda uector,  
then Uu=TO. A s i m i l a r  type o f  r e s u l t  extends f o r  other choices of k. Th is  means 
tha t  i f  the descr ipt ions o f  'agendas' or  'tournaments' are extended from being based 
upon b inary  comparisons t o  being based upon k - fo ld  comparisons, then the new s e t t i n g  
i n h e r i t s  a l l  o f  the we l l  known 'seeding' problems o f  agenda manipulation, etc.  
Moreouer, i f  the k - fo ld  rankings aren't done by the Borda Count, the damage t o  
consistency i s  much worse than i f  the comparisons were made w i t h  the b inar ies.  (The 
dimension o f  Uu i s  la rger  than (N;2).) 
Theorems 7 and 8 can be combined t o  shou tha t  the k a l te rna t i ves  i n  each o f  the 
(N;K) subsets can be ranked i n  any number o f  ways. Howeuer because we are 
consider ing d i f f e r e n t  subsets o f  a l ternat iues,  a hidden e f f e c t  o f  the Borda Count 
mani fests i t s e l f .  
h f i n i t i o n  5.  A u t  of uo t ing  uectors < U ~ J I  are 'Borda independentm i f  the 
subspace spanned by them and doesn't include m y  Borda uectors. 
Again, if vo t ing  uectors are vector normalized, we can exclude En from t h i s  
d e f i n i t i o n .  I t  f o l l w s  imnediately that  fo r  N al ternat iues,  one can define a set o f  
N-2 completely d i f f e ren t ,  Borda independent vot ing methods. 
C o r o l l a r y  8.1. Le t  k  be as  de f i ned  i n  Theorem 8. For each subset o f  k  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  choose k-2 c o m p l e t e l ~  d i f f e r e n t ,  Borda independent v o t i n g  methods. 
Then, f o r  most cho ices  o i  the v o t i n g  methods, Vu i s  the t o t a l  space 
< (E r )g - l ) tN t r ) ,  That  is, f o r  each subset o f  a1 t e r n a t  ives,  s e l e c t  k-2 rank ings  
of the a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Then there  e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  of v o t e r s  so t h a t  when the same 
v o t e r s  rank the i l l  subset of a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i t h  the  J T ~  v o t i n g  method, the 
outcome i s  the  .ill s e l e c t e d  rank ing  o f  the a1 t e r n a t  ives,  i=1,. . ,tN;k), 
Jm1 , r n m  ,k-2. 
For example, i f  WS, k-4, then there e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  v o t e r s  so t h a t  t h e i r  
p l u r a l i t y  r ank ings  ( e ( l , O , O , O ) )  are  at)az)aa)a+, as)aa)at)az, and 
a a a  However, when these same vo te r s  use the  s l i g h t l y  per tu rbed  
v o t i n g  system (1,1/100,0,0), the r ank ing  f o r  each subset i s  reversed. 
.Th i s  concept o f  Borda independent v o t i n g  methods p l a y s  a  r o l e  i n  the rank ing  o f  
a11 poss ib l e  subsets o f  the N a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
C o r o l l a r y  8.2. Consider the .fmily o f  a l l  3- (N+1)  subsets  o f  N a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
For .each subset of k  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  se l ec t  k-2 c a n p l e t e l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  Borda 
independent v o t i n g  methods, and l e t  be the canbined v o t i n g  vec to r .  Then, i n  
general ,  Vu i s  t he  t o t a l  space 
(E2)(N)Z)x ... x ( ( E r ) ~ - t ) ( n j ~ ) x . . . x ( E n ) n - l r n  
We migh t  expect an equ iva len t  r e s u l t  t o  h o l d  i f  f o r  each subset o f  k  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  we s e l e c t  k-1 completely d i f f e r e n t  vectors ,  none o f  which i s  r Bordo 
vector .  But a  hidden e f f e c t  o f  the Borda vector  appears; t h i s  s e t  o f  vec to rs  can be 
re-expressed as k-2 Borda independent vec to rs  and the Borda vec to r .  As we now know, 
the Borda vec to r  leads t o  a  dimensional saving, and so the  dimension o f  Vu i s  
reduced accord ing ly .  The same type o f  argument as g iven  above exp la i ns  why 'Borda 
independentg i s  p a r t  o f  the hypothes is  f o r  the above Co ro l l a r y .  
Next, we present  r s i t u a t i o n  where the Borda vec to r  does no t  o f f e r  r n r  savings 
even though we a re  cons ide r i ng  several  subsets o f  a l t e r n a t i u e s .  
Theorem 9 t81. Le t  N)3, and l e t  F bc a fami ly  of N-1 nested subsets, SJ, j=Z,..,N, where ISJ l= j  and SJ i s  a proper subset o f  SJ+I. For each subset, 
se lect  a v o t i n g  method, and l e t  g be the c o l l e c t i o n  o f  vo t i ng  vectors. Then, fo r  
any choice of @, Vv has dimension (N;2) and equals the t o t a l  space EMx...xEz. 
That i s ,  f o r  any choice of ranKings from each o f  the sets, there ex i s t  choices of 
voters' p r o f i l e s  so that  by us ing the adopted vo t i ng  method t o  rank SJ, the 
outcane i s  the chosen ranking, j=2,..,n. 
The Borda vector provides no advantage here; i t  admits a11 o f  the 
inconsistencies admitted by any other uo t i ng  method. As such, Theorem 7 can be used 
t o  extend the r e s u l t  without worry whether the vectors are 'Borda independentm. 
Coro l la ry  9.1. For each of the w b u t s  S t  i n  Theorem 8, select  j-1 canplete ly  
d i f f e r e n t  u o t i n g  methods. For each subset, se lect  j-1 ranking o f  the a l te rnat iues .  
There e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  of voters so tha t  uhen the ume voters  rank SJ u i t h  the k t n  
vo t i ng  method, the outcaae i s  the k t n  selected ranking o f  the a l te rnat ives ,  
k=l,. . , j-1, j=2,. . ,n. 
Example. Let SJ~(II,..,~J}, j=P,..,N. Then, there ex i s t  p r o f i l e s  of 
voters so tha t  the Borda ranking of SJ i s  a ~ > a r ) . . . ) a ~  i f  j i s  even, but the 
reverse o f  t h i s  i f  .i i s  odd. Moreover, f o r  ~ 1 3 ,  the p l u r a l i t y  ranking of SJ i s  
the same as the Borda ranking i f  j i s  a m u l t i p l e  o f  3, i t  i s  the reverse o f  Borda 
ranking i f  j+1  i s  a mu l t i p le  of 3, and i t  i s  a ~ > a ~ > a r > a r - ~ > . .  i f  j + 2  i s  a 
m u l t i p l e  o f  3. 
Theorem 9 asserts that  i f  spec i f ied  subsets o f  a l t e rna t i ves  are selected, then 
no method a l lows f o r  consistency among the various rankings. (Thus, any such 
rankings are admitted i n  Re.) This may suggest that  methods based upon dropping 
a l te rna t i ves ,  such as the Hare method, can lead t o  serious d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Th is  i s  
true; now i t  i s  easy t o  show that  inconsistencies r e s u l t  f r a a  such h ierarch ica l  
methods. But, the relevant theorem t o  use i s  Theorem 6, not Theorem 9. The reason 
i s  that  fami ly  of subsets defined i n  Theorem 9 speci f ies in advance which 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  are t o  be dropped. Theorem 6 spec i f ies  what can occur over a11 
possible subsets. (On the other hand, Theorem 9 can be used t o  show that  the nested 
property and s t r i c t  formulas which character ize such methods, such as always 
dropping the l a s t  p lace a l t e r n a t i v e ,  can lead  t o  unexpected surpr ises. )  
As s t a t e d  above, the conc lus ion o f  Theorem 9 h o l d s  whether o r  not Borda methods 
are used. But note,  the dimension o f  t h i s  space i s  (N;2), and the dimension of VB 
i n  t h i s  space a l s o  i s  (N;2). R e s t r i c t i n g  a t t e n t i o n  t o  c e r t a i n  subsets o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  equ iva len t  t o  p r o j e c t i n g  VB i n t o  the app rop r i a t e  coord inate 
subspaces o f  T. Theorems 8 and 9 demonstrate t h a t  over these important, na tu ra l  
subspaces, t h i s  p r o j e c t i o n  r e t a i n s  i t s  dimension, so  no sav ings i n  added cons is tency 
o f  r ank ings  i s  achieved. 
The bas ic  quest ion remains; i s  the re  sane way we can reduce the types o f  
i ncons is tenc ies  which can occur by a c l eve r  cho ice o f  a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  the subsets o f  
the N a1 t e r n a t i v e s ?  The mathematical idea f o r  t h i s  i s  the f o l l ow ing :  The vec to r  
space VB i s  a (N;2) dimensional subspace o f  T. R e s t r i c t i n g  a t t e n t i o n  a f a m i l y  o f  
subsets, F, i s  equ iva len t  t o  p r o j e c t i n g  Ve on to  the subspace o f  T, TF, which 
models t h i s  fami l y .  Now, i f  t h i s  f a m i l y  i s  se l ec ted  p rope r l y ,  perhaps the p r o j e c t e d  
dimension of VB w i l l  be reduced, which i n  t u r n  means t h a t  a lower number o f  
i ncons is tenc ies  occur. For example, consider the p lane x=y i n  R3; i t s  p r o j e c t i o n  
on to  the x-z p lane o r  the y-z p lane i s  two dimensional ,  bu t  i t s  p r o j e c t i o n  on to  the 
x-Y p lane i s  one dimensional. 
mat he ma tic all^, t h i s  r ank ing  problem i s  t o  determine whether there e x i s t  
f a m i l i e s  o f  subsets, F, so t h a t  the p r o j e c t i o n  o f  VB i n t o  TF has a lower 
dimension. The somewhat s u r p r i s i n g  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  t h i s  can occur !  Such f a m i l i e s  
are cha rac te r i zed  by the f o l l o w i n g  statement which f o l l o w s  immediately frm l i n e a r  
algebra.  
P ropos i t i on .  L e t  N13 a l t e r n a t i v e s  be giuen. Choose a f a m i l y  of K ~ 2 ~ ~ ) 2 ) - ( N + 1 1  
subsets of a1 t e rna t i ues ,  and l e t  Tc be the subspace of T rep resen t i ng  t h i s  f am i l y .  
I f  t he re  a re  s e t s  of L (but  no t  L+1) l i n e a r l y  independent vec to r s  i n  V8 ( i n  T) 
which a re  normal t o  Tc, then the  dimension o f  the p r o j e c t i o n  of VI i n t o  Tc i s  
<N;2)-L. 
The problem i s  t o  determine when a fam i l y  of subsets s a t i s f i e s  the condi t ion of 
the Proposi t ion.  The governing fac tor  i s  a subt le  symmetry group property which 
turns out t o  be re la ted  t o  the cycles and the Condorcet t r i p l e t  described i n  Section 
2. I f  the indices of the subsets i n  the fami ly  admits t h i s  s m e t r y  property, then 
the p r o j e c t i o n  o f  VB i s  of lower dimension. 
D e f i n i t i o n  6, Le t  F be a fam i l y  of w b s e t s  and l e t  D be the set  Cdjg), l l J<k iN ,  
of scalar  constants which are not a11 zero. Family F i s  sa id  t o  s a t i s f y  the p c l e  
n n n e t r r  p roper ty  u i t h  u t  D i f  for each subset B i n  F 
4.1 ~ d r c t ( g ~ - g u )  1, 
uhere the sumat ion  i s  over the indices of a11 p a i r s  o f  a l t e rna t i ves  i n  B. 
Let 4 be the ( N; 2 )  dimensional vector def ined by set D. 
Theorem 10. Consider a family,  F, of subsets of the N a l te rnat iues ,  and l e t  Tr  
be the subspace of T corresponding t o  t h i s  family.  A necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  
cond i t ion  tha t  the pro jec t ion  of VD i n t o  TF has dimension (N;2) i s  that  F does 
not a d n i t  a cyc le  s m n e t r r  property. 
Consider a11 possible se ts  D uhich def ine a cycle smnretry for F. I f  the 
corresponding se t  of vectors defines an L dimensional space, then the p ro jec t i on  of 
VB i n t o  Tr  has dimension (N;2)-L. 
Th is  theorem h i g h l i g h t s  a major, mathematical cause o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  
soc ia l  choice and i n  vot ing methods. Each subset o f  a l t e rna t i ves  def ines ce r ta in  
algebraic symmetry groups - these are the d i f f e r e n t  wars i n  which the a l te rna t i ves  
can be permuted. But, i n  an attempt t o  make vot ing  ' f a i r '  and 'Consistent', we add 
ex t ra  mathematical requirements. These ex t ra  condi t ions impose the const ra in t  that  
the resu l  t s  must be considered (and hopeful 1 y, consistent) over several d i f f e r e n t  
subsets of a l t e rna t i ves .  The paradoxes, imposs ib i l i t y  theorems, and inconsistencies 
which are c m o n  t o  t h i s  area, then, are manifestat ions o f  the f a c t  that  the 
d i f f e ren t  symmetry groups associated w i th  these subsets of a l t e rna t i ves  aren't 
compatible w i t h  each other. Occasionally, there are fami ly  o f  subsets where the 
symmetry groups associated w i t h  the subsets do admit some compatible subgroups; i n  
these s i t u a t i o n s  addi t ional  consistency resu l ts .  Th is  cycle snnnetry condi t ion i s  a 
way t o  determine whether a p a r t i c u l a r  fami ly  o f  subsets admits t h i s  symmetrical 
permutat ion condi t ion,  and t o  ex t rac t  the s m e t r y  subsets. 
Exvlrples: 1. I t  f o l l w s  f r a n  t h i s  theorem tha t  the fam i l i es  def ined i n  Theorem 9 
do not  s a t i s f y  the cyc le s m e t r y  property.  For example, l e t  the fam i l y  be 
S J = ~ ~ I , . . ~ J ) ,  j=3,..,N, and l e t  SZ be a b inary  contained i n  SI, then the 
p r o ~ e c t i o n  of VB i s  a (N;2) dimensional subspace. Now, def ine a new and la rger  
fami ly  F8 by rep lac ing  SZ w i t h  b i n a r i e s  except (a~ ,az ) ,  (a~ ,aa ) ,  and 
a ,  Le t  set  D be def ined by dtz=l,  d~a=-1, dza=l, and a14 other 
d ru8s  equal zero. Then, F8 s a t i s f i e s  the cycle s m e t r y  proper ty  w i t h  D. Thus, 
the dimension o f  the p ro jec t i on  o f  UB i n t o  t h i s  la rger  dimensional subspace o f  T 
i s  smal ler .  T h i s  example i l l u s t r a t e s  the importance o f  the cond i t ion  i n  Theorem 9 
tha t  the se ts  SJ are nested. 
No t i ce  tha t  t h i s  choice of D def ines a cyc le al)az)aa)at s i m i l a r  t o  
t ha t  de f ined by the Condorcet t r i p l e t .  A r e l a t e d  explanat ion holds f o r  a l l  cyc le 
s m e t r y  se ts  D. 
2. The nested cond i t ion  i n  Theorem 9 can be relaxed. For example, f o r  W6, 
the f a m i l y  i ( a ~ , a z ) ,  (at,az,aa), (az,aa,a4,as), 
(al,az,ar,as,ag),Sg) does not s a t i s f y  the nested set  property,  nor does 
i t  a h i t  a  cyc le  s m e t r y  property.  Therefore, the p ro jec t i on  o f  VB i n t o  TF 
equals Tr .  A complete general izat ion o f  Theorem 9 i s  given by Theorem 10. 
3. L e t  F be the fami ly  of  a 2  subsets which do not include the p a i r  
i a ~ , a z I .  Then F s a t i s f i e s  the cyc le s m e t r y  proper ty  w i t h  d lz=i ,  dru=O f o r  
a11 other  p a i r s .  This  i l l u s t r a t e s  tha t  not only  cyc les are involved i n  the choice 
o f  D sets.  
4. Let  W6,  and l e t  the fami ly  be i(aa,as), (a4,arrag), 
a  , z , ,  a a z , , a , a ,  3 Fran S4, f i v e  D 
sets  can be defined which correspond t o  the f i v e  cycles a ~ ) a z ) r r ) a ~ ,  
a l )a2)a4)a l r  a1)as)a4)a1, a2)as)a4)a2 and 
a1)a2)a3)a4)al1 I t  i s  elementary t o  show tha t  the f i v e  vec to r s  
cor responding t o  these D s e t s  are l i n e a r l y  dependent, bu t  they have a  b a s i s  o f  
d imension 4. Thus, L)4. That L=4 i s  a  simple cmpu ta t i on .  T h i s  example 
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  c yc l es  g rea te r  than those o f  a  th ree  t up le  are invo lved;  the b a s i s  
c o u l d  be d e f i n e d  by the l e a v i n g  ou t  the cyc l e  s m e t r y  corresponding t o  the t h i r d  
cyc le .  I t  a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e s  what can occur i f  some member o f  a  fami l y ,  as Sq 
above, i s  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  chosen so t h a t  each o f  the o ther  members o f  the  f a m i l y  
e i t h e r  con ta i ns  t h i s  se t ,  o r  does no t  con ta in  a  p a i r  f rom t h i s  set .  Then, a l l  the  
s m e t r i e s  of t h i s  s e t  de f i ne  cyc l e  s m e t r i e s  f o r  F. Not i ce  t ha t  one D c y c l i c  
s m e t r y  c l a s s  f o r  F i s  where d l  2'-dl a=l , dzs=dz4=-ds~=1/3. T h i s  
demonstrates t h a t  the re  z rc  s m e t r y  s e t s  where no t  a l l  o f  the magnitudes o f  the 
d r r ' s  a re  e i t h e r  the same constant  or zero.  
5. L e t  N=4, and l e t  F be [SS, Ca1,a211. TWO D s e t s  w i t h  independent D 
v e c t o r s  a re  g iven by the c y c l e s  az)ai)a4)a2 and al)aa)a4)al .  So, 
the p r o j e c t i o n  o f  VB has dimension (4;2)-2=4, which i s  the dimension o f  TF. 
Thus, a l l  poss i b l e  rank ings  a re  poss ib l e  w i t h  any v o t i n g  vector.  
Of course, the obvious extens ions o f  Theorem 10 by u s i n g  systems o f  e i t h e r  
comp le te ly  d i f f e r e n t ,  Borda independent v o t i n g  vec to r s  ( t he  dimension o f  the 
p r o j e c t i o n  o f  Ve i s  l e s s  than t h a t  o f  T r ) ,  o r  cunp le te l y  d i f f e r e n t  v o t i n g  
v e c t o r s  a l s o  ho ld .  
5. Proo+s o+ the theorems 
A1 1  o f  the quest ions  considered i n  t h i s  paper concern a  vector  sum o f  the form 
5.1 n t c r ) B t c a ) .  
Assume t h a t  the vec to r  components o f  W are i n  vec to r  normal ized form. Then, 
CB t t n ) l  i s  i n  T' where T' i s  the ca r t es i an  products  o f  spaces EK which 
rep resen ts  t h i s  f a m i l y  o f  subsets. 
As i t  has been noted e a r l i e r ,  n r t a ,  i s  non-negative f o r  a l l  P(A) and 
5.2 z n r t a )  ' 1 .  
T h i s  means t h a t  these c o e f f i c i e n t s  de f ine  a  s implex i n  the p o s i t i v e  o r than t  o f  a  N! 
Eucl idean space. Consequently, if 
S i<k )  = < x~RKl,xrB, Z X J  = I>, 
then Eq. 5.1 can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as be ing  a r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  the mapping 
5.3. F:Si(N!) -------) T'. 
More p r e c i s e l y ,  de f i ne  F as the mapping i n  Eq. 5.1 where the c o e f f i c i e n t s  <nrta,> 
a re  elements i n  Si(N!) .  For t h i s  mapping t o  correspond t o  a  vote  t a l l y ,  the 
components o f  < n r t a ) >  must be r a t i o n a l  numbers. CA c m o n  denaninator i s  the 
number of v o t e r s  w h i l e  the numerator o f  each component represen ts  the number o f  
v o t e r s  w i t h  a  p a r t  i c u l a r  r ank ing  o f  the a l t e r n a t i v e s . )  Thus, i n  order t o  i n t e r p r e t  
the image of F as a vo te  t a l l y ,  the danain p o i n t  must be a r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  i n  Si(N!) .  
Le t  Vu be the vec to r  space i n  T' spanned by the vec to r s  W r t a ) l .  I t  f o l l w s  
t h a t  
5.4. F:Si(N!) ------- ) VU T'. 
Mhat we show next  i s  t h a t  i f  Vu meets a  r ank ing  r e g i o n  o f  T', then t h i s  i s  the 
group r a n k i n g  f o r  sane s e t  o f  voters '  p r o f i l e s .  As the f i r s t  step, note t ha t  by 
i n t e r p r e t i n g  Eq. 5.1 as  a convex combination o f  the vec to rs ,  i t  f o l l w s  tha t  the 
image s e t  o f  F  i s  the convex h u l l  o f  the vec to rs  {bJrta)> i n  Vu. 
The * i n d i f f e r e n c e m  p o i n t  ~ N H  i n  Si(N!) corresponds t o  where the preferences 
of v o t e r s  a re  e q u a l l y  sp l  i t  among the N! permutat ions o f  the a1 te rna t iues .  From 
t h i s  i t  f o l l o w s  immediately t h a t  
5.5 F(Lny) = &. 
Namely, w i t h  t h i s  even d i v i s i o n  among the voters ,  the group rank ing  o f  any subset o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  canple te  i nd i f f e rence .  For the normal ized vectors ,  t h i s  i s  1. 
Next ,  assume t h a t  the Jacobian F has rank eaual t o  the dimension o f  the 
1 i near subspace Vu. (Th i s  w i  11  be ver i f  ied 1 a te r  .) A consequence of t h  i s  
assumption i s  tha t  F maps an open neighborhood, U, o f  INN i n  Si(N!) t o  an open 
neighborhood o f  1 i n  Vu. But 1 i s  a boundary p o i n t  of a l l  o f  the ranking regions 
of 1'. Therefore, F(U) and Vu meet the same rank ing regions o f  T'. I t  remains t o  
show that  f o r  each such ranking region, there i s  a r a t i o n a l  po in t  i n  U which i s  
mapped t o  t h i s  region. 
Consider the ranking regions where a l l  rankings haue s t r i c t  preference b e t w e n  
a l te rna t i ves .  These ranking regions are open se ts  i n  1'. Consequently, they are 
open se ts  i n  Vu. But, because F i s  l i nea r  and has maximal rank, i t  i s  an open 
mapping. Thus, the in tersec t ion  of F(U) and such a ranking region i s  an open set  i n  
Vu. The c o n t i n u i t y  of F ensures that  the inuerse image o f  t h i s  new open set i s  an 
open set ,  U', i n  Si(N!). The ra t i ona l  po in ts  are dense i n  Si(N!), so there e x i s t  
r a t i o n a l  p o i n t s  which are mapped by F t o  the appropriate ranking region. 
Consider those ranking regions which admit indi f ference among or between sane 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  some subset of a l ternat ives.  Then, i n  some component(s) of T', the 
ranking reg ion i s  a p a r t  of a hyperplane; the boundaries are defined by other 
hyperplanes passing through &. (These are the hyperplanes corresponding t o  those 
other a1 te rnat  ives which are ranked w i  t h  s t r i c t  preference.) The in tersec t ion  o f  
t h i s  rank ing region w i t h  Vu i s  a par t  of a l i n e a r  subspace of Vu. Because t h i s  
set  has g as a boundary po in t ,  the in tersec t ion  o f  F(U) w i th  t h i s  space i s  nonempty, 
so the inverse image i s  a por t ion  of a hyperplane i n  Si(N!). Th is  hyperplane i n  
Si(N!) i s  character ized by the vo t ing  vectors which inuolue ra t i ona l  canponents. 
Thus, t h i s  hyperplane contains ra t i ona l  points. 
We haue establ ished tha t  if the assumption on the Jacobian o f  F i s  true, then 
the set o f  rankings r e s u l t i n g  from a set o f  vo t i ng  methods, W, corresponds t o  the 
set  o f  rank ing regions which meet Vu. Host o f  the remainder of t h i s  sect ion i s  
devoted t o  v e r i f y i n g  the assumption. 
Proof o f  Theorem 7. The bas ic  ideas are i l l u s t r a t e d  w i t h  the p roo f  of Theorem 7. 
That i s ,  f o r  N a l t e r n a t i v e s  and N-1 complete ly  d i f f e r e n t  v o t i n g  methods W =  
( ~ I , . . , ~ N - I ) ,  we w i l l  show 
1) t h a t  the  Jacobian o f  F has the rank equal t o  the dimension o f  Vu, and 
2) t h a t  Vu equals T'=(EM)N-1. 
L e t  M r r ( ~ ) ,  l i j <k (n ,  be the permutat ion mapping from EM back t o  i t s e l f  
which in terchanges the j t n  and the k t n  cmponents  of &. If _=(&I,. ..,&N-I) 
i s  i n  (EnIn-1, then l e t  
5.6) Mrr(X) = ( ~ r r ( ~ l ~ ,  . . . , M K J ( ~ - ~  9. 
L e t  G be the group o f  permutat ions generated by the (N;2) mappings CMrr), and 
def  i ne 
5.7) L(G) = {VlV i s  a l i n e a r  subspace o f  T' which i s  i n v a r i a n t  under G I .  
That  i s ,  i f  M i s  a permutat ion f rom G, then M maps V back i 'n to  i t s e l f .  Because such 
a mapping M j u s t  permutes the components o f  the vectors ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  M maps Vu 
back i n t o  i t s e l f .  Consequently, Vu i s  i n  L(G). To complete the theorem, we 
c h a r a c t e r i z e  the subspaces i n  L(G). F r a  t h i s  i t  w i l l  f o l l o w  t h a t  Vu=T'. 
To cha rac te r i ze  L(G), we determine the e igenvalues and e igenvec to rs  o f  Mrr .  
A s imp le  canpu ta t ion  y i e l d s  t h a t  the e igenvalues are -1 w i t h  m u l t i p l i c i t y  N-1 and +1 
w i t h  m u l t i p l i c i t y  (N-2)(N-1). A s e t  o f  (N-1) e igenvectors  corresponding t o  the 
e igenval  ue -1 are ( = J - ~ K  ,a,. . ,&I, . . ,(&, . . . , = J - ~ K )  where gs, s=l , . . ,N, i s  
the u n i t  vec to r  i n  RN w i t h  u n i t y  i n  the s t n  component and zero i n  a l l  o thers .  
C a l l  the s u b s ~ a c e  spanned & these N-1 vec to rs ,  the -1 ciaenspace for ( j , k ) .  No t i ce  
--
t h a t  the -1 and the + l  eigenspaces f o r  ( j , k )  are orthogonal  t o  each other .  
C la im 1: Let  V be i n  L(G). The p r o j e c t i o n  o f  V i n t o  the -1 eigenspace f o r  -
( j , k )  i s  a l i n e a r  subspace o f  V. 
Proof  o f  the c la im.  C lea r l y ,  the p r o j e c t i o n  i s  a l i n e a r  subspace o f  the -1 
eigenspace f o r  ( j , k ) .  We must show tha t  t h i s  l i n e a r  subspace a l s o  i s  a subspace o f  
V. 
To prove t h i s ,  i t  s u f f i c e s  t o  show t h a t  i f  XI i s  the p ro jec ton  o f  2 i n  V, 
then 21 i s  i n  V. BY us ing  the o r t hogona l i t y  o f  the two eigenspaces, i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t  2 has a unique represen ta t ion  XI+XZ where 2 2  i s  i n  the + I  eigenspace f o r  
j , .  By the invar iance assumption, the vec to r  M J K ( ~ )  = M J K ( ~ I + ~ z )  = 
-21+2z i s  i n  VU. Therefore 
5.8 2 - M J K ( ~ )  221 
i s  i n  Vu. T h i s  completes the proof .  
A consequence o f  t h i s  theorem i s  t h a t  V can be expressed as the d i r e c t  sum o f  a 
vec to r  space from the -1 eigenspace and the +1 eigenspace f o r  ( j , k ) .  The next 
statement shows t h a t  as the j and k vary,  the subspaces obtained by the p r o j e c t i o n  
of V a re  r e l a t e d .  We do t h i s  by showing how they are a11 r e l a t e d  t o  sane one space. 
Claim 2:  For V i n  L(G) l e t  VJK be the subspace obta ined by p r o j e c t i n g  V i n t o  
-
the -1 eigenspace o f  ( j , k ) .  Then M~J (MIK (VJK) )=U~~ .  Both subspaces have 
the same dimension. 
Proof  o f  the c la im.  Not i ce  t ha t  
5.9) N S K ( ~ J - ~ K )  = gr-gs, 
and t h a t  t h i s  i s  a -1 eigenvector f o r  Mrs. Fran t h i s  i t  f o l l a u s  t ha t  MsK(VJK) 
i s  a l i n e a r  subspace o f  the -1 eigenspace f o r  ( s , j )  which has the rune dimension as 
VJK. Because V i s  i n  L(G), Msr(VJK) i s  a l i n e a r  subspace o f  V; hence i t  i s  i n  
VJS. 
A s i m i l a r  argument shows t h a t  l l s ~ ( V J s )  i s  a subset o f  VJK. (MSK i s  an 
i nvo lu t i on . )  Because Msr preserves dimension, i t  f o l l a u s  tha t  Msr(VJS) = 
VsK and t h a t  the dimensions of both l i n e a r  subsets agree. T h i s  completes the 
p roo f .  
The above two c la ims  w i l l  be used t o  charac te r i ze  any V i n  L(G). 
Claim 8 :  Le t  V i n  L(G) be such t h a t  VIz  i s  j dimensional. Then V i s  spanned 
-
by the se ts  VlK, k=2,..,N, and the dimension of V i s  (N-1)j. 
Proof o f  the claim: A basis f o r  En i s  C Q I - ~ K I  where k ranges f r a n  2 t o  
N. Therefore, a basis f o r  T'=(En)N-l i s  the standard one o f  extending the basis 
f o r  each canponent space t o  the product space. 
Assume that  Vl2 i s  j dimensional. According t o  Claim 2, VlK, k=2,..,N i s  a 
j dimensional subspace o f  V. Thus V contains the span o f  these vector spaces. 
Ploreouer, i t  f o l l ows  f r a a  our choice o f  a basis f o r  V tha t  the basis f o r  the 
subspaces form a l i n e a r l y  independent set o f  vectors. Thus, the dimension o f  V i s  
bounded below by (N-1)j. 
I f  the dimension o f  V i s  greater than (N- l ) j ,  then there i s  a vector 2 i n  V 
which cannot be expressed as the l i n e a r  canbination o f  vectors f r a n  the spaces 
V ,  k 2 , N  But, by our choice o f  a basis, t h i s  means tha t  f o r  sane choice o f  
k, the p ro jec t i on  o f  i n t o  the -1 eigenspace o f  (1,k) i s  not i n  VIK, Th is  
con t rad ic t s  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  VIK, 
Canpletion o f  the proof o f  Theorem 7. Because Vu i s  i n  L(G), i t s  dimension 
i s  (N-1)j where j i s  the dimension o f  Vlzu, the pro jec t ion  o f  Vu i n t o  the -1 
eigenspace o f  (1,2). We show that  i f  the vo t ing  vectors are canplete ly  d i f f e r e n t ,  
then j=N-1. 
Assume that  Vl2u i s  j dimensional. This means that  a basis f o r  Vl2u i s  
given by Cgs), rl,..,j. Here, each g s  i s  a l i n e a r  canbination of the N-1 
vectors (g~-g~,&,..,fi), ..., (&,..,&,%I-=I). By a standard row reduct ion 
argument (and perhaps by a reassignment o f  the order of the vo t i ng  vectors i n  Y) we 
can assume that  the basis C=s) i s  replaced w i t h  an equivalent basis Cgs) where 
where a s r  = 1 f o r  s=k, s=l,..,j; 
= 0 f o r  k i j ,  k#s; 
I t  fo l lows f ran  Eq. 5.9 and Claim 2 that a basis fo r  MfK(V12u) = V I K U  i s  
< d l K s l  where d i g s  i s  ( ~ ~ I ( ~ I - Q K , . . , ~ ~ N ( ~ I - = K ) ) .  Thus, a  bas i s  f o r  
Vu i s  g i ven  by 
5.11) <g IKs l ,  k=2,.. ,N; ssl,.., j. 
The vec to r  p ( W N  I , . . ,PN+ 1 i s  i n  the space Vu, so i t can be expressed as  
a  l i n e a r  c a b i n a t i o n  o f  the vec to rs  f rom Eq. 5.11. Each u o t i n g  cmponent Ps i s  
i n  a  space EN which i s  spanned by the vec to r s  <&I-QK~. Therefore,  i t  has a 
unique l i n e a r  r ep resen ta t i on  i n  terms of t h i s  bas is .  nu t  because o f  the row reduced 
form o f  the vec to r s  i n  Eq. 5.11, t h i s  means t h a t  the canponents bJMg, k i j ,  un i que l y  
determine the  rep resen ta t i on  o f  i n  terms o f  the b a s i s  5.11. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the 
l i n e a r  canb ina t i on  used t o  determine WNK i n  EN un ique l y  determines the l i n e a r  
combinat ion o f  the vec to rs  r equ i r ed  t o  represen t  the kTn component o f  g, 
k=2,. . ,N. 
Assume t h a t  j<N-1, and l e t  s  be such t h a t  j<siN-1.  Because o f  the row reduced 
form of the b a s i s  vectors ,  i t  f o l l ows  t h a t  the l i n e a r  combination r equ i r ed  t o  
represent  the kTn vec to r  component o f  W y i e l d s  aKsWNK i n  the sTn component, 
+ 1 N - 1 ,  k l , ,  For t h i s  t o  hold,  the v o t i n g  vector  ps must be a l i n e a r  
caab ina t ion  o f  the vec to r s  <pr l ,  k=l,..,j. T h i s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  the assumption 
t h a t  the v o t i n g  vec to r s  are completely d i f f e r e n t  f o r c e  j+-1 and canple tes the 
p roo f .  
The key idea i n  the aboue proof  i s  t o  use the mappings MKJ t o  determine a 
b a s i s  f o r  Uu. Once t h i s  i s  done, then the r e s t  o f  the p roo f  i s  s imple vec to r  
ana lys is .  T h i s  bas ic  theme p e r s i s t s  i n  what f o l l ows ,  bu t  there are some s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e rences .  The most se r i ous  one i s  t h a t  the permutat ion map, MJK, doesn't admit 
an ex tens ion  o f  the type g iven i n  Eq 5.7 when more than one subset o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
a re  considered. To see t h i s ,  l e t  N=3 and consider MI z on the space 
T'=ESx(EZ)S. The vec to r  (2,0,-2;1,-1;1,-1;1,-1) i s  the Borda vector  84 
where A i s  the r ank ing  a ~ ) a z ) a r .  Now, i f  Mlz(Ba) were de f ined  as i n  Eq. 
5.7, then the outcome would be (0,2,-2;-1,l;-1,l;-1,l). But t h i s  corresponds t o  the 
incons is ten t  ranking az>al>ao; az)a l ,  a3)a1, and a3)az. 
I t  i s  c lear  what p roper t ies  we want the extension o f  a mapping, such as MIZ,  
t o  haue. We wish 1) t o  interchange the a1 and the a2 a l t e rna t i ues  i n  the 
ranking, and 2) t o  map elements fram CW,rta,l back i n t o  t h i s  se t .  I t  can be seen 
from the aboue and other examples tha t  t o  preserue consistency, the permutation 
mapping on subsets of a l t e rna t i ues  i s  determined both by the choice o f  permutation 
napping on the t o t a l  set o f  a l t e rna t i ues  and by the choice o f  the ranking o f  the 
a l t e rna t i ues .  Th i s  leads t o  the f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n .  
D e f i n i t i o n  7. Let  C be a rank ing  of the N a l te rna t iues ,  and l e t  W,c i n  T be the 
v o t i n g  uector  corresponding t o  C. Define flrr(tdc) = W,rtc) where P(C) i s  the 
rank ing  obta ined from C by interchanging the pos i t i ons  o f  a r  and a ~ .  Let  
5.13 f l r r ( ~ d c ~ c ) = ~ d c M x r ( ~ c ) ,  
where the sunra t ion  index, C, I s  ouer a11 rankings of  the N a l te rna t i ues  and where 
dc i s  a sca lar .  
Exunp 1 e : Le t  b 3 .  When the mapping MI 2 i s  def ined ouer the space T and when 
the rank ing  i t  i s  operat ing on i s  A, then MI~=(MIZ,MIZ,E,E) where E i s  the 
i d e n t i t y  napping. On the other hand, if the ranking i s  al>aa)az, then 
nl z = ( ~ I  , M ~  ,nl , M ~  2) .  When there i s  on ly  one se t  of ternat iues,  Is in 
Theorem 7, t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  reduces t o  Eq. 5.7. 
T h i s  type o f  s t ruc ture ,  where a c o l l e c t i o n  of  mappings i s  def ined ouer a 
product space and each component mapping depends upon what was the mapping and the 
base p o i n t  i n  same previous camponent space, i s  c a l l e d  a wreath m. (See, f o r  
exaraple, [3,41.)  Thus, the permutation mappings ouer the space of rankings o f  
subsets o f  a l t e r n a t i u e s  def ines a wreath product o f  permutation mappings. 
( I n c i d e n t l y ,  as i t  w i l l  be shown elsewhere, many o f  the chron ica l led  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  
soc ia l  choice can be explained and extended by use of t h i s  wreath product.) 
(As a b r i e f  aside, I would l i k e  t o  point  out tha t  t h i s  wreath product captures 
the s n r m e t r ~  proper t ies  of  the simplex. Th is  can be seen by us ing a normal izat ion 
where the components, WJ, i n  the v o t i n g  vec to rs  a re  a l l  non-negative and sum t o  
u n i t y .  T h i s  changes the under ly ing  space from EN t o  the simplex Si(N) where 
subsets of a l t e r n a t i v e s  correspond t o  faces and edges o f  t h i s  simplex. Then i t  i s  
easy t o  see t h a t  the above wreath product coord ina tes  s m e t r y  ac t i ons  on the faces  
and edges o f  the simplex w i t h  s m e t r y  a c t i o n  i ns i de  the simplex.) 
BY use o f  Eq. 5.13, i t  i s  easy t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  Vu i s  i n  L(G)=CVIV i s  a  
l i n e a r  subspace which i s  i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  respect  t o  6, the group generated by the 
permutat ion mappings HIJ). On the other  hand, the  extension of HKJ i n  
D e f i n i t i o n  7 does not  de f ine  a l i n e a r  mapping. (There are choices o f  vec to r s  2 and 
w_ so t h a t  
5 .14  M J K ( ~ - ~ _ ) A ~ J ~ ( ~ ) + J K ( ~ )  .) 
Thus, because the p roo f  o f  Theorem 7 depends upon the 1 i nea r i  t y  of HJK, i t  does 
no t  extend d i r e c t  1  y  t o  the general set  t ing. The purpose of most o f  what f 01 1 ows i s  
t o  overcame the e f f e c t s  o f  Eq. 5 . 1 4 .  
Le t  T be as de f ined  e a r l i e r ;  i.e., T=ENX(EN-~)(N;N-I)X,.X(E~)(N~~). 
Claim 4. Consider the se t  o f  vec to rs  Cyctr)  i n  T which are const ructed i n  the 
-
f o l l o w i n g  way. For each choice of k  and J, k)J, consider a  canponent subspace, C, 
of  T which represen ts  a  subset o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  which inc ludes ar  and aw. Then, 
the vec to r  component of ~ C J K  corresponding t o  the subspace C i s  Cer-or); a l l  
o ther  vec to r  components are p. The set  o f  these vectors ,  as ( K , j )  vary over a11 
poss ib l e  cho ices  o f  ind ices  and as C ranges over a1 1 canponent subspaces o f  T, span 
The v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  c l a im  i s  obvious. A count ing  argument shows t h a t  t h i s  s e t  
o f  vec to r s  i s  no t  l i n e a r l y  independent. 
I f  i s  i n  Vu, then so i s  the vector  v + j g ( Y ) .  (Th is  i s  because Vu i s  
i n  L(G) .) Vector  d i f f e rences  o f  t h i s  type rep lace the r o l e  o f  the '-1 eigenspace o f  
( j , k ) '  when we determine a bas i s  f o r  UU. To i l l u s t r a t e  the ideas i n  a s i m p l i e r  
s e t t i n g ,  we f i r s t  prove Theorem 9. 
Proof  o f  Theorem 9. Without l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  assume tha t  
S J I , J  2 Let  e<un ,p - l , . . , ( l , - I ) )  be the c o l l e c t i o n  o f  
normal ized v o t i n g  vec to r s  se lec ted  t o  rank the a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Because W_n i s  a 
vot  i n9  vec to r ,  there i s  sane adjacent p a i r  o f  we igh t s  which a re  no t  equal. Le t  j be 
the f i r s t  index where w:>w:+~. 
Cons i de r 
5.15 Y ~ t a )  - f l r n ( ~ r t n ) ) ,  
k=l,..,N-1, where u p ( & )  i s  de f ined  i n  terms o f  k and j i n  the f o l l o w i n g  way. For 
given va lue o f  k ,  P(A) i s  a rank ing  o f  the N a l t e r n a t i v e s  where aw i s  i n  jTn  
p lace w h i l e  an i s  the ( j + l ) T n  place. The remainder o f  the a l t e r n a t i v e s  can be 
ranked i n  any way. Now, because au and an are ad jacent  i n  the rank ing  and 
because an i sn ' t  i n  any o f  the s e t s  SJ f o r  j<N, i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i f  these two 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  a re  transposed, i t  won't a f f e c t  the rank ings  i n  any other  subset S:, 
j<N. Consequently, the vec to r  i n  5.15 i s  the p o s i t i v e  sca la r  m u l t i p l e  (wr-wr- I )  
o f  
5.16 (=K-~M;P,..,~), 
k 1 , N - 1 .  By cons t ruc t i on ,  these vec to rs  are i n  V u .  f loreouer, they form a 
b a s i s  f o r  the subspace ENxgx..xg. Therefore, t h i s  subspace i s  contained i n  V u .  
Next ,  the mappings HUN-I are app l i ed  i n  the same way where j i s  se lec ted  t o  
be the f i r s t  index where two adjacent cmponents o f  un-1 are n o t  the same. Then, 
Eq 5.15 y i e l d s  vec to r s  o f  the form 
5.17 (~:(~U-~M-I),(WJ-~:-I)(~K-~M-I),~,~.,~). 
But,  because Eq. 5.16 forms a b a s i s  f o r  Enx..xQ, f o r  each choice o f  k ,  there i s  a 
canbi na t  i o n  o f  these vec to r s  which equals (-b:(gu-gn- I ,a,. . ,O).Thus, i t 
f o l l aws  t h a t  the vec to r s  (g,g~-g~-~,g,..,a), k=l,..,N-2, are i n  Uu. T h i s  
forms a b a s i s  f o r  fixEn-1x&x..xg. 
Continuing w i t h  the obvious induct ion argument, i t  fo l lows tha t  Uu conta ins 
EMxEN-lx..xEZ. Th is  completes the proof.  
The key po in t  of t h i s  proof i s  that  the s m e t r y  propert ies of permutations o f  
SJ d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from those of Sr ,  j#k. Th is  d i f ference i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
enough so tha t  an element i n  L(G) cannot have a n o n t r i v i a l ,  proper subspace of 
EJxEK. Because t h i s  s r m e t r y  incampat ib i l i t y  i s  based on permutations of the 
a l te rna t i ves ,  i t  p e r s i s t s  uhen j -1 campletely d i f f e r e n t  vo t ing  methods are used t o  
rank EJ. Thus, the proofs o f  Theorem 7 and the above cambine t o  prove t h i s  
specia l  case o f  Corol lary 9.1. 
Proof o f  Theorem 4. On the space T'=<EZ)(Nj2) consider 
5.18 W ~ t a )  - P l r r i W ~ t a ) )  
where j and K range through a l l  possible p a i r s  i n  the order k=j+l,..,N, j=l,..,N. 
For each p a i r  o f  indices (J,K),  P(A) i s  a ranking where a~ i s  the top ranked 
a1 te rnat  ive and ar i s  the second ranked a1 ternat  ive. Because these a1 ternat  iues 
are adjacent i n  P(A), and because t h i s  p a i r  doesn't appear i n  any other set  o f  
a l t e rna t i ves ,  t h e i r  t ransposi t ion i n  P(A) doesn't e f f e c t  the ranking o f  any other 
p a i r .  Therefore, the vector di f ference i n  Eq. 5.18 has (2,-2) i n  the one component 
corresponding t o  the p a i r  (ar,ar), and i n  a11 others. These (N;2) vectors 
form a (N;2)x(N;2) mat r ix  w i t h  two dimensional vectors as the entr ies.  Because o f  
the order ing  o f  the indices, the en t r i es  along the diagonal o f  t h i s  mat r ix  are 
(2,021 and Q o f f  the main diagonal. That these (N;2) vectors are l i n e a r l y  
independent i s  imnediate. Thus UP has vector dimension (N;2) and i t  contains (and 
hence equals) T'. 
To s i m p l i f y  the notat ion, i f  (ar,ar> i s  contained in  a subset de f i n ing  a 
component space o f  T, c a l l  i t  'an ( j ,k) component space'. 
R o o f  of Theorem 6. F i r s t  we show tha t  VB has dimension (N;2). To do th i s ,  f o r  
each j and k, consider Eq. 5.18 where 8 replaces W and where P(A) ranges through a l l  
rankings where or i s  the iTn ranked a l t e rna t i ve ,  a~ i s  the ( i + l ) T n  ranked 
a1 te rna t  i ve ,  i=l,. . ,N-1. Now, i n  a ( j  ,k) component space o f  T, the vector 
d i f f e r e n c e  f r a n  Eq. 5.18 i s  ( w ~ - ~ I + ~ ) ( Q J - ~ K ) .  But, f o r  a Borda Vector, 
(~x-w1+1)=2 f o r  a11 choices o f  i. Since the vo t i ng  vector f o r  W 2  i s  (1,-I), 
t h i s  d i f fe rence i s  2(1,-1). Therefore, Eq. 5.18 i s  independent o f  i, and i t  def ines  
a vector  ZUJK where ~ J K  has (13-LK) i n  any ( j , k )  canponent space, and 1 i n  
a11 others. 
The se t  QJK), j < k ,  has (N;2) vectors which are l i n e a r l y  independent. (The 
l i n e a r  independence fo l l ows  the proof of Theorem 4; the vectors used i n  t h i s  proof  
are the l a s t  (N;2) vector caponents  of  the vectors ~ J K . )  To prove the theorem, 
i t  su f f i ces  t o  show that  any vector Bpta) can be expressed as a l i n e a r  canbinat ion 
o f  the YJK vectors. 
F i r s t  we show tha t  
5.19 Efi = ~ J K ,  
where the sumat  ion i s  over lL.i<k<N. Consider a subset, D, o f  s iN a1 te rna t  ives. 
Le t  j be such tha t  or i s  i n  D. Then, f o r  exac t ly  s-1 choices o f  k f j ,  ~ J K  has a 
non-zero vector  component i n  the space corresponding t o  the set  0. Each o f  these 
vec tors  has a non-zero component i n  the d i r e c t i o n  corresponding t o  ar ;  i t  i s  +1 i f  
k i t  i s  -1 i f  k .  Therefore, i n  the component corresponding t o  the subset 0, 
the sum i n  Eq. 5.19 i s  (s-1, s-3,..,s+1-2i,..,l-s). Thus, the sun i s  the Borda 
vector .  
Next,  we shou tha t  can be expressed as a l i nea r  combination o f  the 
VJK vec to rs  f o r  any choice o f  P(A). But, any P(A) can be expressed as the 
- 
composit ions o f  t ransposi t ions o f  the ranking A. So, i t  s u f f i c e s  t o  show that  i f  
Bpta) can be expressed by such a canbination, then so can Bc where C i s  a 
- 
rank ing  obtained by a t ranspos i t ion  of  same two a l t e rna t i ves  which are adjacent i n  
the ranking P(A). According t o  Eq. 5.18, t h i s  i s  given by B?(A)+%JK fo r  the 
choice o f  j and k determined by the t ransposi t ion.  
The above demonstrates that VB i s  spanned by ( 2 ~ ~ 1 ,  j <k .  That the Z 
vectors are orthogonal t o  the space VB fo l l ows  from the simple computat ion that  
each such vector i s  orthogonal t o  the basis. That the L vectors determine a bas is  
f o r  the normal space of VB f o l l a * s  fram a counting argument. ( I n  t h i s  counting 
argument, note that  the r s  detemined f o r  the subset o f  a l te rnat iues  D are l i n e a r l y  
dependent. There are s such vectors, but any s-1 o f  them are l i n e a r l y  independent. 
Th is  i s  a consequence o f  our normalization.) Th is  canpletes the proof o f  pa r t  b. 
Proof of pa r t  a. Let  W be the c o l l e c t i o n  o f  vot ing uectors. I f  each vot ing  
method d is t ingu ishes between the top and the second ranked a l te rnat iue ,  then l e t  the 
normal i z a t  ion o f  the vot ing  vectors be w 1 w p 2 .  For each choice o f  j<k ,  l e t  
P(A) be the ranking where ar i s  the top ranked a l te rna t iue  and ar i s  the second 
ranked a l te rnat iue .  Then, Eq. 5.18 y ie lds  WJK, j <k .  Because these vectors form 
a bas is  f o r  VB, i t  f o l l w s  that  VB i s  a subspace o f  VU. 
Assume that  there are some vot ing methods r e f l e c t e d  i n  g w h i c h  do not 
d i s t i ngu ish  between the top two ranked a l te rnat ives .  Because t h e w  camponents are 
vo t ing  vectors, they must d is t ingu ish  between same two rankings. F ix  j and k, and 
consider a l l  possible rankings of the a l te rna t i ves  where ar i s  the i t n  ranked 
a l te rna t iue  whi le  ar i s  the ( i + l ) T n  ranked a l te rna t iue  f o r  each i=l,..,N-1. For 
each such ranking, i n  each ( ~ , k )  component space Eq. 5.18 has a non-negative 
mu1 t i p l e  o f  (gr-gr). When id, t h i s  mu l t i p le  i s  w l w z ;  and i t  occurs (N-2)! 
t ines.  (Th is  i s  the number o f  rankings o f  A s a t i s f y i n g  t h i s  condition.) When i>1, 
i t  i s  a canbinatoric problem t o  determine the number o f  d i f f e r e n t  rankings o f  the N 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  where i-(s+1) elements of D and s elements not i n  D can be ranked ahead 
o f  ar and ar. Th is  w i l l  determine how of ten i n  Eq. 5.18 the scalar m u l t i p l e  
WX-5-1-1-5 w i l l  occur. Notice that these numbers are independent o f  the choice 
o f  j and k; they only depend upon the choice o f  the vot ing vector, the number of 
elements i n  D,  and N. 
Add a11 o f  these vector  d i f f e rences  fran Eq. 5.18 together .  The r e s u l t i n g  
vec to r  has a pos i  t i ve  sca la r  mu1 t i p l e  (~J-cK)  i n  each canponent represen t ing  a  
( j  ,k) subset o f  a1 t e rna t  ives.  T h i s  sca la r  depends on1 y  upon the choice o f  the 
v o t i n g  uec to r  and the number o f  elements i n  t h i s  subset,  not  on the choice o f  j , k ,  
o r  i. Normal ize the  v o t i n g  vec to rs  so t h a t  t h i s  v e c t o r  i s  a  sca la r  m u l t i p l e  o f  
J (To a v o i d  r e n o r n a l i z i n g  the v o t i n g  vec to r  used t o  rank p a i r s  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  the d i f f e r e n t  v o t i n g  vec to r s  a re  sca led  s o  t h a t  t h i s  sum o f  vec to r s  i s  
~ [ (N-~) ! IN-ZV_JK. )  Thus, V_JK i s  i n  the cor responding VU. Because the 
no rma l i za t i on  doesn't depend upon the choice o f  j and k ,  t h i s  statement i s  t r ue  f o r  
a1 1 cho ices  o f  j and k. From t h i s  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  Up i s  a  subspace o f  Vu. 
Next ,  we must show t h a t  i f  GI i s  not  a  Borda vec to r ,  then VB i s  a  proper 
subset o f  Vu. To do t h i s ,  we examine the l a s t  argument more c l ose l y .  Since the 
choice o f  j and k  o n l y  in f luences  the choices o f  subsets  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  be ing  
considered, we s t a r t  by cons ider ing  the i nd i ces  1  and 2, and l a t e r  we i nd i ca te  what 
changes must be made t o  ob ta in  the general p roo f .  
Consider the  vec to r  d i f fe rences  Y r t e )  - M ~ z ( Y r t a ) >  where on l y  the choice 
of P(A) v a r i e s .  Furthermore, t o  s i m p l i f y  the n o t a t i o n ,  l e t  w*s denote 
ws-ws+~.  When A i s  the standard ranking, t h i s  vec to r  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  
w * I ( Q I - ~ ~ )  i n  each 1,2 canponent space. Next,  we cons ider  rank ings  where a1 
i s  the  second ranked a l t e r n a t i v e  and az i s  the t h i r d  ranked a l t e r n a t i v e .  The on l y  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  which concern us  are those ranked above a1 and az. So, consider 
the N-2 rank ings  ob ta ined  i n  the f o l l ow ing  order:  The j - 2  r ank ing  has a r  as the 
top ranked a l t e r n a t i v e ,  the rank ing  o f  the a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  the k tn ,  k=4,..,N, 
p o s i t i o n  i s  determined i n  sane a r b i t r a r y  fash ion.  Then, the vector  components o f  
the d i f f e rence  have a sca la r  mu1 t i p l e  w*2 f o r  those (1,2,j) component spaces, and 
w*l f o r  the remain ing (1,2) canponent spaces. (No t i ce  t ha t  t h i s  vector  i s  
independent o f  what i s  ranked i n  the k t n  p o s i t i o n ,  k=4,..,N.) 
For each i=3,..,N-2, cont inue i n  the same fash ion .  Let a1 be the i l n  
ranked a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and l e t  as be the ( i + l ) l n  ranked a l t e r n a t i v e .  Consider the 
(N-2;i-1) r ank ings  obtained by choosing s e t s  o f  t i - 1 )  a l t e r n a t i u e s  ranked above a1 
and a2. The o r d e r i n g  o f  these a l t e r n a t i v e s  i sn ' t  important, j u s t  the choice o f  
the set .  For each o f  these rankings, determine the uec to r ' d i f f e rence .  The 
r e s u l t i n g  sca la r  m u l t i p l e ,  w*s, i n  each (1,2) component space depends upon how 
many o f  the se lec ted  ( i -1)  elements are a l s o  i n  t h i s  set. N o t i c e  t h a t  the se t  of 
vec to r s  ob ta i ned  i n  t h i s  way inc ludes a l l  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  Eq. 5.18 where (j,k)=(1,2) 
and P(A) has a1 and a2 adjacent i n  the rank ing .  
Na, cons ider  these vec to rs  where i n  each component space we use the appropr ia te  
w*s ( r a t h e r  than i t s  numeric value). Given any such vector ,  we can determine the 
va lue o f  i and the elements o f  the se l ec ted  s e t  o f  ( i - 1 )  elements. Indeed, t h i s  
a l ready  can be determined by the (1,2) component subspaces o f  N-1 elements. Namely, 
because o n l y  one element i s  l e f t  out  o f  each these subsets, the l a rges t  subscr ip t  s 
o f  wrs f rom these components i s  the va lue o f  i. To determine the se t ,  we compute 
i t s  complement. For each component subspace w i t h  m u l t i p l e  w*r-I, the element 
which i s  i n  the t o t a l  s e t  bu t  no t  i n  t h i s  subset i s  i n  the complement. I n  f a c t ,  
t h i s  same a n a l y s i s  can be done over a l l  o f  the (1,2) component subspaces o f  K 
elements where K)3. A consequence o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  no two o f  these vec to r s  are the 
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These vec to r s  span a subspace. ( T h i s  subspace p l a y s  the same r o l e  as the 
subspace i n  the -1 eigenspace f o r  (1,2) i n  the p roo f  of Theorem 7 . )  We al ready know 
t h a t  a  l i n e a r  combinat ion o f  these vec to r s  equals g12. I f  any o f  these uec to rs  
d i f f e r s  f rom a sca la r  m u l t i p l e  of g12, then t h i s  subspace i s  a t  l e a s t  o f  dimension 
2. (By comparing the component spaces f o r  the b i n a r y  p a i r  (a l ,az) ,  i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t  t h i s  sca la r  m u l t i p l e  must be 2.) T h i s  would be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  proue t ha t  Vu 
p r o p e r l y  con ta i ns  VB independent of what happens f o r  a  s i m i l a r  ana l ys i s  f o r  the 
o the r  cho ices  o f  j and k. 
Now suppose each such vector equals ZWI 2. When the ranking i s  A, t h i s  means 
that f o r  a l l  (1,2) component spaces, the vot ing  vector has wt-w2=2. By 
comparing the vector from a l l  ( ~ , 1 , 2 )  component spaces, i t  fo l lows that w z - w ~ 2 .  
As J varies, t h i s  captures a11 of  the vot ing  vectors f o r  (1,2) component spaces. 
Continuing i n  the same fashion through a11 choices o f  i, i t  f o l l w s  that a l l  o f  the 
vot ing  vectors f o r  (1,2) canponent spaces are Borda Vectors. Applying the same 
analys is f o r  a1 1 choices o f  J<k proves par t  a of  the Theorem 6. 
Proof of p a r t  c. For each subset of s  a l te rnat ives ,  there are s-1 choices o f  
the dif ferences w * ~  i n  the d e f i n i t i o n  of  the vo t ing  uector. The scalar 
normalizat ion reduces one of these degrees of f r o d a n ,  so there are s-2 degrees o f  
freedom i n  the choice o f  a vo t ing  uector. Let ~ ( N - P ;  i-2). A simple counting 
i 
argument s h w s  that  there are d d i f f e r e n t  subsets o f  a1 ternat iues which contain the 
p a i r  ( a ~ , a i ) .  Therefore, i n  the choice of the vo t ing  uectors t o  rank these 
subsets o f  a1 ternat  i ues, there are Z(N-~; i-2)( i-2) degrees of  freedom. The above 
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construct ion def ined d uectors. N w ,  i f  these vectors are l i n e a r l y  independent, 
then the l i n e a r  space defined by them i s  of  f u l l  dimension d. That is,  f o r  each 
(1,2) component space, the uector which has ( Q I - ~ z )  i n  t h i s  canponent and a i n  
a l l  others i s  i n  Vu. Thismeans that Vu contains t h i s  subspace. But, l i n e i r l y  
dependent means the uectors must s a t i s f y  an algebraic condi t ion (from a vanishing 
determinent). On the other hand, being independent i s  an 'open' condition; i f  there 
i s  a t  l eas t  one uector leading t o  independence, then t h i s  i s  the standard, generic 
condit ion. 
To shar that  most uectors y lead t o  independent vectors i n  t h i s  (1,2) space, i t  
su f f i ces  t o  shar tha t  the open set i s  nonempty. Thus, we only need t o  show that i f  
W corresponds t o  p l u r a l i t y  uoting, then a11 of these vectors are l i n e a r l y  
- 
independent. But, f o r  a p l u r a l i t y  vot ing uector, w*l )O,  w*mO for  s ) l m  To show 
independence, we use the aboue construct ion, s t a r t i n g  w i t h  the l a s t  ranking and 
working forward. 
If a1 and az are the bottom two ranked a l te rna t iues  (i4-I), then only i n  
the subset of two a l te rnat ives  do they emerge as the top two a l ternat iues.  Thus, 
the vector  d i f fe rence has 1 i n  a11 components except i n  the component space f o r  the 
p a i r  (al ,az) where the mu l t i p le  i s  2. Next, consider i+-2 where ar i s  the 
bottom ranked a l te rnat iue .  I n  t h i s  vector d i f fe rence,  only the components f o r  the 
subsets Cal,az,ajI and Ca~,azI  have p o s i t i v e  mu l t i p les .  But, the f i r s t  
stage o f  i W - 1  can be used t o  obtain (N-3) vectors w i t h  zero i n  a l l  but the (1,2,j) 
canponent space, where the ent ry  i s  (21-22) .  The same argument i s  continued 
ouer the var ious values o f  i and the d i f f e r e n t  subsets o f  a1 ternat  iues. Th is  
canpletes the proof  f o r  (1,2). The same argument holds f o r  a11 choices o f  ind ices  
k .  Th is  canpletes the proof of Theorem 6 and i t  shows that  i f  kl consists o f  the 
p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  scheme f o r  a11 subsets, then Vu=T. 
Seueral places i n  t h i s  paper there are informal c m e n t s  assert ing that  f o r  
c e r t a i n  types o f  uo t i ng  methods, ce r ta in  conclusions hold. For economy of 
exposi t ion,  proofs o f  these statements aren't supplied, but i t  i s  c lear  from the 
above proof  tha t  these condit ions involve showing tha t  a ce r ta in  number o f  the 
W_ttn) vec tors  are independent. To ass is t  the reader in terested i n  v e r i f y i n g  the 
c m e n t s  made here, we ou t l i ne  a geanetric proof which s i m p l i f i e s  the analysis. 
For W4, we indicate the algebraic condi t ions the vector components o f  Id_ must 
s a t i s f y  i n  order that  V u g .  I t  fo l lows from the proof o f  Theorem 6 that  we want 
t o  f i n d  the dimension o f  the subspace spanned by Up tn ) -M~r (k l r t n j )  for  each 
p a i r  j < k ,  and where P(A) var ies ouer a l l  permutations o f  A such that  or i s  the 
i t n  ranked a l te rna t iue  whi le aw i s  the ( i + l ) T n  ranked a l te rnat iue .  So, 
consider j=l, k=2. The canponents f o r  the spaces (al,az), (al,az,aa), 
(a~,az,a+), and S4 i n  t h i s  d i f ference def ine the vectors 
where the components w*r  = W J - ~ J + I  f o r  the vo t ing  vectors o f  the respect ive 
subsets. (We suppress the notat ion which ind ica tes  tha t  the choice o f  the wr's 
can vary w i t h  the subsets.) The general s i t u a t i o n  g ives a pat te rn  s i m i l a r  t o  the 
middle 2x2 mat r ix .  Blocks appear which assume the form o f  a square mat r ix  w i t h  a 
daninant diagonal term. This i s  a consequence o f  the s m e t r y  of the wreath 
product . 
We want t h i s  set t o  have a minimal number o f  l i n e a r l y  independent uectors. I t  
has dimension one i f  and only i f  they are a l l  the same, but t h i s  corresponds t o  
where the d i f fe rences W J - ~ J + I  are the same constant f o r  a l l  j .  These are the 
Borda vectors. Th is  set o f  vectors can def ine a two, three, or  four dimensional 
subset when sane o f  the Borda components are replaced w i t h  other vo t ing  methods. 
Assume now that  none of the vectors are Borda, and tha t  f o r  each set,  W I Z # O ,  
Because i t  i s  the l a s t  three components o f  each vector which determine the 
independence, we p l o t  these four  vectors i n  three space. The f i r s t  vector 
determines the d i s tan t  vertex of a rectangle, wh i le  the next two determine po in ts  on 
two o f  the three faces o f  the rectangle conta in ing t h i s  vertex. For a minimal 
dimension o f  independence, these three po in ts  and the o r i g i n  o f  the rectangle must 
l i e  on the same plane. Th is  imposes a strong a lgebraic condi t ion on the weights. 
Moreover, the l a s t  po in t  must a lso l i e  on t h i s  plane. 
From t h i s  we see why uot ing systems which d i s t i nqu ish  between only two subsets 
can't s a t i s f y  such s t r ingent  vector condit ions. Th is  i s  because they can be 
normal ized so tha t  they def ine a u n i t  cube i n  the appropriate dimensional space. 
Hmeuer, because a1 1 but one of the components WJK are zero, the vectors end up on 
axes or lower dimensional coordinate planes, and the symnetry propert ies change the 
locat ions.  Thus, they cannot be on planes of the type described aboue. 
Proof of Theorem 5. For t h i s  theorem, the space i s  T'=(EN)x(Ez)tNiz'. 
The obvious modi f icat ion of the above shows that  Ve has dimension (N;2). Thus, 
a11 we need t o  show i s  that  i f  W_n#BN, then Vu=T'. But, p not being a  
Borda Vector means that  there are a t  leas t  two choices o f  s, say j and k, where 
w*J&*K. Consequently, there are choices o f  P(A) so that  the vector d i f fe rence 
i n  Eq. 5.20 has a  w * ~  as the m u l t i p l e  o f  21-&z i n  the f i r s t  component, 
2(=1-=I) as the component f o r  the b inary,  and i n  a l l  other cmponents, w=j,k. 
I t  i s  obvious that  these two vectors are l i n e a r l y  independent, so they f i l l  the 
maximum dimesion f o r  t h i s  (1,2) space. Th is  i s  t rue  f o r  a11 choices o f  j<k .  Thus, 
Vu conta ins T'. Th is  canpletes the proof.  
- 
Proof of Theorem 10. Let  TF be the subspace o f  T  corresponding t o  the 
fami ly  F. A normal vector t o  TF, F4, i s  i n  VB i f  and only i f  i t  can be expressed 
as a  l i n e a r  combination o f  the basis uectors. That i s ,  N has the desired proper t ies  
i f  and on ly  i f  there ex i s t  scalars B ( d r r 3  such tha t  
5.20 N ~ J K V J K .  
Those vector  components of N which correspond t o  members o f  F  must be 9; o t h e r w i s ~  
wouldn't be a  normal vector t o  Tc. Because o f  the form o f  the vectors gar, 
t h i s  means tha t  f o r  each member B o f  F, the sum < d j ~ ( ~ j - ~ g ) = ~  where the 
s u m r t  ion i s  over the indices w i t h  pa i r s  o f  a1 te rnat ives  i n  B. 
Suppose that  there are several sets D which def ine a  c y c l i c  srrametry property 
f o r  F. Each set  def ines a  vector i n  the (N;2) space Ve. Now, since a11 normal 
vectors t o  TF which are i n  VB has such a  representat ion, the dimension L  i s  
given by the dimension o f  the space spanned by the D vectors. This completes the 
proof o f  Theorem 10. 
(Second) Proof o f  Theorem 9. Assume that F  i s  the fami ly  o f  nested subsets 
def ined i n  the statement o f  Theorem 9. As before, assume that  
~ = a ~ , a , . , a ~ l ,  = , , N  Moreover, assume that  there e x i s t s  a set 
b < d ~ r l  which de f ines  a c y c l i c  symmetry proper ty  f o r  F. By induction, we w i l l  
show tha t  a11 o f  the d ~ r ' s  must be zero, which i s  a cont rad ic t ion  t o  the 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  D. 
Because S2 i s  a member of t h i s  fami ly ,  d12(=1-~2)=&, or d12=0. 
Assume t h a t  f o r  s23, d r p 0  i f  j<kis-1. We now show t h i s  i s  t rue  f o r  j < k l s .  
But, because Ss i s  a member o f  F, the sum Eq 5.20 must hold f o r  a11 j < k l s .  BY tho 
induct ion hypothesis, t h i s  sum i s  ~ d r s g r - ~ & d r S ) + s ~ & .  Because the uectors 
<grl are l i n e a r l y  independent, the c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  =J must be zero. That i s ,  
the terms d:pO f o r  j < s .  Th i s  campletes the proof .  
Proof o f  Theorem 8. Let  F be the fam i l y  of  subsets def ined i n  the statement 
of  the Theorem. F i r s t ,  assume tha t  k 4 - 1  and t h a t  t h i s  fami ly  has the c y c l i c  
s m e t r y  p roper ty  w i t h  set D. BY d e f i n i t i o n ,  not a11 of  the terms d r r  equal zero, 
so assume wi thout  l oss  of  genera l i t y  tha t  d1z#0. We use an induct ion argument t o  
show tha t  d l p d l j  f o r  j=3,..,N. F i r s t ,  t h i s  i s  shown f o r  ~ = 3 .  
Consider the on ly  member o f  F which i s  miss ing aa. Eq 5.20 must ho ld  f o r  the 
associated se t  o f  p a i r s  o f  a l te rna t iues .  Thus, i n  order tha t  the g~ term 
uanishes, i t  f o l l o w s  tha t  
5 21 I - I :  j ) 3 -  
Thus, the surmation on the r i g h t  hand side must be nonzero. Now consider the 
subset where a2 i s  the miss ing a l te rna t iue .  Again i t  fo l lows from Eq. 5.20 and 
from the vanishing o f  the g~ coe f f i c i en t  that  
5.22 dll = - i d l r ,  ~ > 3 ,  
SO d 1 3 ~ d 1 2 .  
Assume tha t  d l r = d ~ z  fo r  j<s .  We now show tha t  d1s=d12. TO do th i s ,  
consider the member o f  F where as i s  the missing a l t e rna t i ve .  Then, i t  fo l l ows  
from Eq. 5.20 that  
5.23 d l2 = -C ~ I J  where j)2, j#s.  
BY us ing Eq. 5.20 f o r  the subset which i s  missing as, we haue tha t  d l s  equals 
the s u m a t i o n  on the r i g h t  hand side of Eq. 5.23. Thus, dlz=dls, and the 
induct ion proof is cmpleted. 
Nar, consider any member o f  F. The 21 c o e f f i c i e n t  frm Eq. 5.20 i s  
- 1 .  Because t h i s  c o e f f i c i e n t  must be zero, i t  fo l lows tha t  d1zr0. Th is  
con t rad ic t i on  canpletes the proof f o r  k=N-1. 
Let  k be such that 2<k<N-1. Assume that  F i s  c y c l i c  symmetric w i t h  set D 
where, w i thout  loss o f  general i ty ,  dlz#O. Consider the the subfamily o f  F 
cons is t i ng  o f  the k t 1  subsets o f  k elements which can be constructed from the 
elements < a ~ , . . , a ~ + ~ l .  Because t h i s  subfamily i s  contained i n  F, i t  must be 
c y c l i c  snnnetr ic  w i th  respect t o  D. But, the above argument then s h w s  that  
d~z=O. T h i s  contradict ion completes the proof.  
L.nna. Consider the two l i n e a r  subspaces o f  T, UU and Uu, where the 
second i s  a proper subspace o f  the f i r s t .  Then, there are ranking regions o f  T 
which meet VU but do not meet Vu. 
Proof.  Let N be a vector i n  Vu which i s  normal t o  UV. Because N i s  i n  T, 
each vector  component o f  C1 i s  normalized, and i t  corresponds t o  a ranking o f  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  subset o f  a l te rnat iues .  I t  s u f f i c e s  t o  s h w  that  Vu does not meet the 
rank ing region corresponding t o  the l i s t i n g  of rankings def ined by B. To do t h i s ,  
i t  s u f f i c e s  t o  s h w  that  any boundary vector f o r  t h i s  ranking region i s  not 
orthogonal t o  M. 
The boundary surfaces f o r  t h i s  ranking regions are given by the uarious 
ind i f fe rence planes i n  the component spaces o f  T. That is ,  i f  i n  sane component 
space, we haue nr)nr ,  then the bounding plane i s  given by XJ'XK. Choose the 
normal vector t o  t h i s  plane which po in ts  t o  the i n t e r i o r  of the ranking region, 
i .e.,  the vector =S-=K. The scalar product w i t h  N_ and such a normal vector t o  
the boundary of the ranking region has, f o r  each component space, a pos i t i ve  value 
(n t -n~>O) .  Thus, a l l  of the boundaries o f  the rank ing region form an angle o f  
l ess  than 900 degrees, so t h i s  ranking region cannot meet Uv. 
Proof o f  the theorems i n  Section 2. We have shown that  Vu contains VB. 
These theorems f o l  low f r a n  the above lema.  
The proofs  o f  the Coro l la r ies  8.1 and 8.2 are obvious combinations o f  the 
proofs o f  Theorems 7 and 8. I f  the pro jec t ion  o f  VB i s  the t o t a l  space, then there 
i s  no i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t  among the subsets o f  the a l te rnat ives ,  and so the proof o f  
Theorem 7 can be used d i r e c t l y .  I f  the p ro jec t i on  of Ue isn' t  equal t o  the t o t a l  
space, then there i s  a modi f icat ion t o  take i n t o  account the i n te rac t i on  e f f e c t  
among the subsets of a1 ternat  iues given by the Borda vectors. Th is  i s  the source of 
the Borda independence condi t ion. .  
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